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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit issued several decisions that had a significant impact on patent 
law.  In a major win for patent owners, the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.1 created the potential for 
dramatic increases in damages awards, when it held that patent owners 
can recover lost profits from foreign use of an invention.2  The fate of 
invalidation proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) hung in the 
balance in 2018.  In Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC,3 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the PTAB 
inter partes review (IPR) proceedings.4  In a case decided on the same 
day, SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu,5 the PTAB’s partial institution practice was 
struck down by the Supreme Court.6  This case fundamentally 
transformed strategy for both petitioners and patent owners at the PTAB.  
The Federal Circuit maintained a large patent docket in 2018 with 
over half of its opinions issuing on appeals from the PTAB.  Many of 
the cases decided in 2018 involved novel legal questions regarding 
venue, tribal sovereign immunity in PTAB cases, the statutory 
interpretation of the one-year bar in IPR proceedings, apportionment 
of damages, Article III standing to appeal adverse PTAB decisions, and 
continued to address the question of patent eligibility. This Article 
collects and summarizes the Federal Circuit’s 2018 patent decisions 
and analyzes their impact. 
I.    CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
Claim construction remained a popular issue presented in Federal 
Circuit appeals in 2018 because claim construction gets a de novo 
review at the Federal Circuit.  Most cases followed the standard 
framework articulated in Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America 
LLC7 and addressed common disputes such as incorporating 
                                               
 1. 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). 
 2. Id. at 2139. 
 3. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
 4. Id. at 1379. 
 5. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
 6. Id. at 1358. 
 7. 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The words of a claim are generally given 
their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in 
the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.”); see also 
Blackbird Tech LLC v. ELB Elecs., Inc., 895 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (vacating 
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limitations from the specification into the claims and the use of plain 
and ordinary meaning.8  For PTAB appeals, claim construction was 
again a common theme in the cases that the Federal Circuit remanded 
or reversed.9  This Section highlights a few of the interesting claim 
construction decisions from 2018. 
The most notable claim construction cases in 2018 dealt with 
collateral estoppel effect of prior judicial constructions. In Knowles 
Electronics LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.,10 an appeal from the decision of 
PTAB in a reexamination proceeding, the Federal Circuit determined 
that the PTAB properly considered extrinsic evidence in its claim 
construction analysis because the intrinsic evidence was not definitive 
as to the meaning of the term “package.”11  More importantly, the 
Federal Circuit addressed the interplay between the construction of 
the same term in a 2011 Federal Circuit case and the PTAB’s 
construction in the reexamination.12  The Federal Circuit rejected 
Knowles’s argument that the PTAB erred by failing to evaluate the 
Federal Circuit’s claim construction during its claim construction 
                                               
the district court’s claim construction requiring the attachment surface be secured to 
the ballast cover where plain language of the claim did not require such an attachment 
and embodiments in the specification describing this attachment mechanism were 
exemplary); Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma Co. v. Emcure Pharm. Ltd., 887 F.3d 1153, 
1154, 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court’s claim construction in 
a Hatch-Waxman case because the plain language of the claim covered what was 
depicted in the claim, the (–)-enantiomer). 
 8. See Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming PTAB’s claim construction that comported with claim’s 
plain language read in light of the specification); Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision 
Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming PTAB’s claim construction 
because proposed construction impermissibly sought to import limitations from 
specification into claims); Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 884 F.3d 1352, 
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming PTAB’s construction); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic 
Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same). 
 9. See TF3 Ltd. v. Tre Milano, LLC, 894 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(holding the PTAB’s construction unreasonably broad where its construction 
expanded the claims beyond what was disclosed in the specification); In re Power 
Integrations, Inc., 884 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding the PTAB’s 
construction of “coupled’ unreasonably broad because it would make every element 
in a circuit “coupled” to every other element rendering phrases in the claim 
meaningless); In re Hodges, 882 F.3d 1107, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting the PTAB’s 
construction of “signal” as “an act, event, or the like that causes or incites some action” 
unreasonably broad). 
 10. 883 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 11. Id. at 1363–64. 
 12. Id. at 1364–65 (citing MEMS Tech. Berhad v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 447 F. 
App’x 142 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
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analysis and found that the PTAB’s construction was consistent with 
the prior judicial construction, and thus proper.13  Judge Newman 
dissented, arguing that “consistency” was the wrong inquiry.14  Rather, 
Judge Newman asserted “[t]he question is whether the PTAB decision 
is precluded by the prior judicial decision, and whether any equitable 
or due process exception to preclusion may apply.”15  In this case, 
because preclusion applied, Judge Newman argued that the prior 
Federal Circuit construction should have bound the PTAB.16 
Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc.17 applied collateral estoppel 
based on a prior Federal Circuit claim construction of the same term 
in a related patent.18  In an appeal of a different but related patent 
owned by Steuben Foods, the Federal Circuit construed the term 
“aseptic,” and relied on binding lexicography in the specification.19  In 
this case, the claims at issue used the term “aseptic” in a similar fashion.20  
Because neither party identified any material difference between the 
two patents or their prosecution histories that would give rise to claim 
construction issues, the court vacated the PTAB’s construction and 
construed “aseptic” to have the same meaning as the prior appeal.21 
The Federal Circuit also addressed the issue of claim language 
sufficient to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).22  In Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple Inc.,23 
the Federal Circuit considered whether the use of “program” and “user 
interface code” in a claim element invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.24  The 
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in construing the 
limitations “program that can operate the movement of the pointer 
(0)” and “user interface code being configured to detect one or more 
locations touched by a movement of the user’s finger on the screen 
                                               
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1372 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1373. 
 17. 884 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 18. Id. at 1351. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1352. 
 22. Section 112(f) specifies that an “element in a claim for a combination may be 
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of 
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to 
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and 
equivalents thereof.”  35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
 23. 891 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 24. Id. at 1006–07. 
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without requiring the exertion of pressure and determine therefrom a 
selected operation” as means-plus-function claims.25  The failure to use 
the word “means” in these limitations created the rebuttable 
presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.26  To overcome the 
presumption, Apple was required to demonstrate that “the claim term 
fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function 
without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”27  
Because Apple failed to do so, it failed to rebut the presumption 
against application of § 112, ¶ 6.28  The Federal Circuit found that the 
district court, which relied on Apple’s arguments, “erred by effectively 
treating “program” and “user interface code” as nonce words, which 
can operate as substitutes for “means” and presumptively bring the 
disputed claims limitations within the ambit of § 112, ¶ 6.”29 
One of the most significant changes in claim construction was made 
by rule, not case law.  In 2018, the PTO enacted a rule that changed 
the claim construction standard for all America Invents Act (AIA) 
invalidity challenges that were filed on or after November 13, 2018.  
The standard changed from the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard to the same standard used in district courts.30  Because the 
claim construction rule change was not retroactive, the Federal Circuit 
will be addressing claim construction disputes under the broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard for years to come.   
One interesting 2018 case, Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Google LLC,31 
considered the role of prosecution history plays in a claim construction 
determination using the broadest reasonable construction standard.32  
In the final written decision, the PTAB presented alternative rulings on 
claim construction—a primary ruling holding that no prosecution 
history disclaimer occurred and an alternative ruling assuming 
prosecution history disclaimer—and found the claims invalid under 
each.33  The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB erred in 
declining to apply prosecution disclaimer in its primary ruling.  It 
reasoned that because the amended claim included a sufficient 
                                               
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1007. 
 27. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 28. Id. at 1007–08. 
 29. Id. at 1008. 
 30. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100, 42.200, 42.300. 
 31. 882 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 32. Id. at 1135–36. 
 33. Id. 
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explanation for the changes and the examiner confirmed that 
explanation, the amended claims met the requirements for prosecution 
history disclaimer and were allowable.34 
The interpretation of product-by-process claim language also took 
center stage in 2018 in In re Nordt Development Co.,35 an appeal of the 
PTAB’s affirmance of the examiner’s claim rejections.36  During 
prosecution, the examiner found that the phrase “injection molded,” 
recited throughout the claim, described a “method of manufacturing 
an apparatus,” whereas the claim was an apparatus claim.37  The 
examiner rejected the claims contending that “[i]n order to anticipate 
the injection molded feature, the prior art must disclose the finished 
product and not the method of making the product.”38  The PTAB 
affirmed the finding that the applicant did not “persuasively explain 
what structural limitation is imparted by this manufacturing 
practice.”39  The Federal Circuit disagreed and found that the phrase 
“injection molded” connotes structure and noted that the specification 
describes injection molding as forming an integral component.40  The 
court further noted that “words of limitation that can connote with 
equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process of 
manufacture are commonly and by default interpreted in their 
structural sense, unless the patentee has demonstrated otherwise.”41  
The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s anticipatory rejection based 
on an incorrect claim construction and remanded for the PTAB to 
construe the term “injection molded.”42 
II.    VALIDITY 
A.   Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
The Federal Circuit addressed nine § 101 cases in 2018.  Section 101 
provides that “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” is 
                                               
 34. Id. at 1136. 
 35. 881 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 36. Id. at 1372. 
 37. Id. at 1374. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1375. 
 41. Id. at 1375–76 (citing 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 
F.3d 1365, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 42. Id. at 1376. 
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patent-eligible if it meets the other statutory requirements.43  However, 
this provision “contains an important implicit exception: [l]aws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”44  
In Alice Corp.  v. CLS Bank International,45 the Supreme Court set forth 
a two-step framework for distinguishing a patent that claims laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim 
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.46  The first step requires 
discerning “whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those 
patent-ineligible concepts.”47  The first step is the search for an 
“inventive concept” sufficient “to ensure that the claim amounts to 
‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea itself.”48  If the claims are 
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the court then considers the 
“elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered 
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements 
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”49  
Many of the cases included dissents or concurrences expressing 
concerns about the current state of patent eligibility jurisprudence.50 
1. Cases implicating the timing of subject matter eligibility challenges 
Several Federal Circuit cases in 2018 made it more difficult for 
defendants in a patent litigation to challenge subject matter eligibility 
in the early stages of the litigation.  For example, in Berkheimer v. HP 
                                               
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 44. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). 
 45. 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 46. Id. at 217. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing 
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18). 
 49. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77–79 (2012)). 
 50. See, e.g., In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s 
temptation to assess underlying facts during the eligibility determination will topple 
the current framework and stifle science and arts); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, 
Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Plager, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (scrutinizing the process of finding abstract ideas for involving 
redundant steps and an elusive search for inventiveness, and asking “[i]s it any wonder 
that the results of this process are less than satisfactory”); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 
F.3d 1369, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that 
§ 101 “needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by Congress” and opining that 
“[t]he Supreme Court whittled away at the § 101 statute in Mayo by analyzing abstract 
ideas and natural phenomena with a two-step test” that introduces aspects of §§ 102 
and 103 into the eligibility analysis), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018). 
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Inc.,51 the Federal Circuit held that “[w]hile patent eligibility is 
ultimately a question of law, the district court erred in concluding 
there are no underlying factual questions to the § 101 inquiry.”52  In 
this case, the Federal Circuit considered whether a patentee waived his 
ability to argue that the dependent claims are separately patent eligible 
when the district court treated the sole asserted independent claim as 
representative.53  Here, because the patentee did not agree to make 
the independent claim 1 representative, and the district court 
improperly treated the claim as representative because it was the sole 
asserted independent claim, the Federal Circuit found that the 
patentee did not waive its arguments regarding the dependent 
claims.54  The court then turned to the two-step Alice test.  In step one, 
the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s argument that the claims 
are not abstract because the parsing limitation of the claims “roots the 
claims in technology and transforms the data structure from source 
code to object code.”55 The court found that limiting the invention to 
a technological environment does “not make an abstract concept any 
less abstract under step one.”56  Regarding step two, the Federal Circuit 
found that a subset of asserted claims contain limitations directed to 
an arguably unconventional inventive concept.57  Because the step two 
analysis involved a disputed question of fact, the district court’s 
summary judgment of the invalidity of these claims was improper.58  
Judge Lourie concurred, noting that “the law needs clarification by 
higher authority, perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so 
many in the innovation field consider are § 101 problems.”59
 In Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,60 issued only a 
week after Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
erred in finding the claims invalid under the § 101 at the Rule 12(b)(6) 
stage of the litigation.61  The district court granted the defendant’s 
                                               
 51. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018). 
 52. Id. at 1369. 
 53. Id. at 1365. 
 54. Id. at 1365–66. 
 55. Id. at 1367. 
 56. Id. (quoting Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 
1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 57. Id. at 1370. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) 
(Lourie, J., concurring), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018). 
 60. 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018), reh’g denied, 890 F.3d 1354 (2015). 
 61. Id. at 1123. 
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding the asserted claims invalid as 
directed to ineligible subject matter.62  The Federal Circuit vacated, 
finding that the district court erred to the extent that it held the claims 
ineligible solely because it directed to an intangible embodiment.63  
Because the representative claim constituted a system claim, the Federal 
Circuit found that it fit within one of the four statutorily provided 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter, unlike claims to pure data 
and claims to transitory signals embedded with data.64  Writing 
separately, Judge Reyna disagreed “with the majority’s broad statements 
on the role of factual evidence in a § 101 inquiry,” stating that Federal 
Circuit’s “precedent is clear that the § 101 inquiry is a legal question.”65 
Next, Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Systems & Software LLC66 involved 
issue preclusion at the Rule 12(b)(6) phase.67  Voter Verified, 
previously sued Election Systems’ predecessors alleging infringement 
of the patent asserted in the present case.68  The court in the prior case 
entered summary judgment in favor of Voter Verified, concluding that 
all claims except one were not invalid under § 101 because Election 
Systems failed to present any arguments or evidence regarding the 
invalidity of these claims.69  On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined 
that the district court did not err in holding these claims were not 
proven invalid.70  Over six years later, Voter Verified sued Election 
Systems in a different venue, and Election Systems filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that all asserted 
claims were invalid under § 101.71  Voter Verified argued that issue 
preclusion prevents Election Systems from relitigating the § 101 
issue.72  The district court granted the motion to dismiss and 
concluded that Alice’s two-step analysis constituted “a substantial 
change” in the law such that “the issue of patent validity is not 
precluded from further litigation.”73 
                                               
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1125–26, 1130. 
 64. Id. at 1125. 
 65. Id. at 1130 (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 66. 887 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 2019 WL 113159 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019). 
 67. Id. at 1379. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1380. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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The Federal Circuit first addressed the threshold issue of whether 
Alice was “a substantial change” in the law such that issue preclusion 
did not apply.74  The Federal Circuit concluded that Alice did not alter 
the governing law of § 101 because the Supreme Court applied the 
same two-step framework it created in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.75 in its § 101 analysis.76  The Federal Circuit 
next considered the four required elements for issue preclusion under 
the Eleventh Circuit’s test77 and determined that issue preclusion did not 
apply here because the § 101 issue was not actually litigated in the first 
district court action and was not necessary to the judgment in that case.78 
Applying the two-step Alice framework, the Federal Circuit found 
that the claims as a whole are drawn to the concept of voting, verifying 
the vote, and submitting the vote for tabulation—fundamental 
activities that have been performed by humans for hundreds of years, 
and therefore are “nothing more than abstract ideas.”79  Because 
neither party disputed that the claims recited the use of a general 
purpose computer that carries out the abstract idea, the Federal 
Circuit determined that there was no inventive concept sufficient to 
transform the claims into patent-eligible subject matter.80 
2. Claims found eligible 
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.81 involved a software 
innovation—“a method of providing computer security by scanning a 
downloadable and attaching the results of that scan to the 
downloadable itself in the form of a ‘security profile.’”82  For software 
innovations, like the claims at issue in Finjan, the first inquiry often 
                                               
 74. Id. at 1381. 
 75. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 76. Id. at 1382 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)). 
 77. The Eleventh Circuit requires a showing of all of the following four elements 
for issue preclusion to apply: 
(1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior 
litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior suit; (3) 
the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical 
and necessary part of the judgment in that action; and (4) the party against 
whom the earlier decision is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding. 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 327 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 78. Voter Verified, Inc., 887 F.3d at 1383–84. 
 79. Id. at 1385. 
 80. Id. at 1386. 
 81. 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 82. Id. at 1303. 
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turns on whether the claims focus on “the specific asserted 
improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that 
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely 
as a tool.”83  The Federal Circuit found the claims to be directed to a 
non-abstract improvement in computer functionality because the 
claimed method “employs a new kind of file that enables a computer 
security system to do things it could not do before.”84 
Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc.85 also dealt with a 
software invention and involved Alice’s step one analysis.86  The asserted 
claims were directed to an improved user interface for computing devices, 
particularly devices with small screens.87  Specifically, the majority found 
that the invention improves efficiency by bringing together function and 
commonly accessed data in a summary window without requiring the user 
to open the application.88  Therefore, the asserted claims were not 
directed to an abstract idea of an index, as argued by LG.89 
Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International 
Ltd.90 addressed the patent eligibility of method of treatment claims.91  
The Federal Circuit held that the claims of the asserted patent were 
patent eligible.92  When applying Alice step one, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the West-Ward’s contention that similar claims were found to 
be patent ineligible in Mayo, and Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc.93  The court noted that the claims in Mayo were not 
directed to a novel method of treating a disease but instead, were 
targeted at a diagnostic method based on the “relationships between 
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood 
that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause 
harm.”94  As such, Mayo’s claim as a whole was not directed to the 
                                               
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1305. 
 85. 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 86. Id. at 1361–63. 
 87. Id. at 1362–63. 
 88. Id. at 1363. 
 89. Id. at 1362. 
 90. 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-817 (U.S. Dec. 27, 2018). 
 91. Id. at 1121. 
 92. Id. at 1136. 
 93. Id. at 1134–36 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 
U.S. 66, 74–75 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 
580 (2013)). 
 94. Id. at 1134 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). 
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application of a drug to a patient.95  Here, the claims were directed to 
a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific 
compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome and 
therefore were different from Mayo.96  Further, unlike the claims in 
Mayo, the asserted claims encompass more than the natural 
relationship between compounds; instead, they recite a method of 
treating patients based on this relationship.97  The court found that 
Myriad did not compel a different result because “the asserted claims 
fall squarely within categories of claims that the [Supreme] Court 
stated were not implicated by its decision.”98  Chief Judge Prost 
dissented and argued that the claims were directed to a law of nature, 
and therefore were patent ineligible.99 
3. Claims found ineligible.  
In SAP America, Inc. v. Investpic, LLC,100 another software invention 
case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the 
asserted claims were not patent-eligible.101  The asserted patent 
described and claimed systems and methods for performing certain 
statistical analyses of investment information.102  Applying the two-step 
Alice framework, the Federal Circuit found that the asserted claims 
were directed to abstract ideas; namely, selecting certain information, 
analyzing it, using mathematical techniques, and reporting or 
displaying the results of the analyses.103  The fact that the information 
describes real investments did not change the analysis.104  Regarding 
Alice step two, the Federal Circuit concluded that nothing in the claims 
moved them from the class of a subject matter ineligible application to an 
eligible application.105  Although some of the claims required hardware 
                                               
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1136. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 
595–96 (2013) (disclaiming that the Supreme Court’s holding does not implicate 
method claims, applications of knowledge about genes, or the alteration of naturally 
occurring genetic code). 
 99. Vanda Pharm. Inc., 887 F.3d at 1140 (Prost, C.J., dissenting). 
 100. 898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 101. Id. at 1163. 
 102. Id. at 1163–64. 
 103. Id. at 1167. 
 104. Id. at 1168. 
 105. Id. 
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components, these limitations required no improved computer resources 
and in fact, are already available computers would suffice for the claims.106 
The Federal Circuit in Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,107 affirmed 
the district court’s determination that the asserted claims directed to 
the operation of an “attention manager” that provides information to 
a computer user without interfering with the user’s primary activity 
failed to recite patent-eligible subject matter.108  Applying the abstract 
idea step of the two-step Alice framework, the majority found that the 
recited claims were directed to an abstract idea because “they consist 
of generic and conventional information acquisition and organization 
steps that are connected to, but do not convert, the abstract idea—
displaying a second set of data without interfering with a first set of 
data—into a particular conception of how to carry out that concept.”109  
Turning to Alice step two, the majority found that nothing in the claim 
converted the abstract idea into an inventive concept.110  Judge Plager 
wrote separately to “concur in the carefully reasoned opinion” by the 
majority based on the current state of the law and to “dissent from our 
court’s continued application of this incoherent body of doctrine.”111 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment that all of the asserted patent claims were ineligible under 
§ 101 in BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.112  The asserted patents are 
directed to a “self-evolving generic index” for organizing information 
stored in a database.113  Under step one of the Alice framework, the 
Federal Circuit “agree[d] with the district court that the asserted 
claims are directed to the abstract idea of considering historical usage 
information while inputting data.”114  The Federal Circuit rejected the 
patent owner’s argument that the claims could not be directed to 
abstract ideas because their limitations were not satisfied by a generic 
computer.115  In this case, the database structure provided a generic 
environment in which the claimed method is performed, and thus, the 
recitation of a database structure slightly more detailed than a generic 
                                               
 106. Id. at 1169–70. 
 107. 896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 108. Id. at 1338. 
 109. Id. at 1346. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1348 (Plager, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 112. 899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 113. Id. at 1283. 
 114. Id. at 1286. 
 115. Id. at 1286–87. 
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database did not save the asserted claims at step one.116  The Federal 
Circuit also found that the alleged benefits raised by the patent owner 
were not improvements to database functionality, but instead were 
benefits that flow from performing an abstract idea with a well-known 
database structure.117  Under step two of Alice, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the district court that the asserted claims lacked an 
inventive concept.118  The court noted that “[i]f a claim’s only 
‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using 
conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been 
transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.”119  
In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the only alleged 
unconventional feature was the requirement that users are guided by 
summary comparison usage information or relative historical usage 
information which is the abstract idea.120 
In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V.121 dealt with subject matter 
eligibility in the patent examination context.122  The claims at issue 
were directed to rules for playing a dice game and specifically, the 
markings (or lack thereof) on the dice.123  The examiner rejected the 
claims as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101 
and the PTAB affirmed.124  Under Alice step one, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the PTAB that the claims were directed to the abstract idea 
of “rules for playing a dice game.”125  The court found no error in the 
PTAB’s use of a more refined characterization of the claimed abstract 
idea as a means of acknowledging one method of organizing human 
activity.126  The Federal Circuit rejected the applicant’s argument that 
the claimed dice have markings on one, two, or three die faces and 
were therefore not conventional.127  The court found that the printed 
indicia on each die did not functionally relate to the substrate of the 
die, and therefore the markings constituted printed matter.128  Because 
                                               
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1288. 
 118. Id. at 1291. 
 119. Id. at 1290–91. 
 120. Id. at 1291. 
 121. 911 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 122. Id. at 1158–59. 
 123. Id. at 1159. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1160–61. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1161. 
 128. Id. 
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the printed matter, to which  § 101 is inapplicable, constituted the only 
disputably unconventional aspect of the recited method of playing a 
dice game, the Federal Circuit held that “the rejected claims do not 
recite an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed 
subject matter into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea.”129  
Judge Mayer wrote separately in concurrence and argued that “claims 
directed to dice, card, and board games can never meet the [§ ] 101 
threshold because they endeavor to influence human behavior rather 
than effect technological change.”130  Judge Mayer also disagreed with 
the court’s statement that patent eligibility inquiry “may contain 
underlying issues of fact,” and stated that “subject matter eligibility 
under . . . § 101 is a pure question of law, one that can, and should, be 
resolved at the earliest stages of litigation.”131 
B.   Anticipation 
The Federal Circuit addressed anticipation in several contexts in 
2018.  In Monsanto Technology LLC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,132 
the Federal Circuit considered inherent anticipation.133  At issue in 
Monsanto was the extent to which extrinsic evidence, specifically expert 
declarations, may be used to support what is “necessarily present” in a 
prior art reference’s teaching.134  Noting that “[i]t is well established 
that such reliance on extrinsic evidence is proper in an inherency 
analysis,”135 the Federal Circuit concluded that the expert declarations 
did not expand the meaning of the prior art reference or serve as prior 
art; they demonstrated what is inherent in the prior art reference.136  
The Federal Circuit therefore held that substantial evidence supported 
the PTAB’s finding that the applied reference inherently anticipated a 
disputed limitation of the challenged claims.137 
                                               
 129. Id. at 1162. 
 130. Id. at 1162 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. 
 132. 878 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 133. Inherent Anticipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An invention’s 
lack of novelty arising from the existence of prior-art products or processes that 
necessarily possess the same characteristics.  Inherency differs from obviousness in that 
a lack of novelty must be based on fact, not mere possibility or probability.”). 
 134. Monsanto Tech. LLC, 878 F.3d at 1345. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1346. 
 137. Id. at 1347–48. 
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In Core Wireless S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,138 the jury found the 
asserted claims remained valid, even though the plaintiff chose not to 
present any affirmative evidence to rebut the defendant’s prima facie 
case of anticipation.139  The accused infringer, LG, argued that because 
the plaintiff failed to present affirmative evidence in rebuttal, it was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the applied reference 
anticipated the claims.140  The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed 
the denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, 
finding that the jury was entitled to evaluate the testimony of the 
defendant’s expert and determine whether defendant clearly and 
convincingly established that the reference anticipated the claims.141  
The Federal Circuit noted that “granting judgment as a matter of law 
for the party carrying the burden of proof is generally ‘reserved for 
extreme cases,’” and this case did not rise to that level.142 
Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.143 involved application of the on-sale 
bar.144  A patent is invalid under the on-sale bar if, before the critical 
date, the product is the subject of a commercial offer for sale and the 
invention is ready for patenting.145  The asserted patents in Medicines 
Co. covered an improved process for manufacturing a drug product of 
bivalirudin, marketed by Medicines Co. under the brand name 
Angiomax.146  On February 27, 2007, Medicines Co. entered into a 
distribution agreement stating that Medicines Co. desired “to sell the 
Product” to Integrated Commercialization Solutions, Inc. (ICS), and 
ICS “desire[d] to purchase and distribute the Product.”147  The 
agreement further forbade the Medicines Co. from selling Angiomax 
to any other party for the duration of the contract.148  The Federal 
Circuit found that the terms of the distribution agreement made clear 
that Medicines Co. and ICS entered an agreement to sell and purchase 
the product, and thus constituted a commercial offer for sale for 
purposes of the on-sale bar.149  The Federal Circuit remanded to the 
                                               
 138. 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 139. Id. at 1363–64. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1364. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 881 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 144. Id. at 1352–53. 
 145. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). 
 146. Medicines Co., 881 F.3d at 1349. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1352–53. 
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district court to consider whether the distribution agreement covered 
the patented product.150 
The court dealt with the impact of prior reexamination decisions in 
Exmark Manufacturing Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, 
LLC.151  In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the district court 
erred by basing its summary judgment of no invalidity solely on the fact 
that the asserted claim survived multiple reexaminations.152  The court 
held that a reexamination confirming patentability of a patent claim 
alone is not determinative of whether a genuine issue of fact precludes 
summary judgment of no invalidity.153  The holding is supported by 
prior Federal Court decisions that a district court “is never bound by 
an examiner’s finding in an ex parte patent application proceeding.”154  
Instead, the deference owed to the decisions of the PTO takes the form 
of the presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282.155  The 
presumption of validity can be overcome by the patent challenger who 
meets its burden of providing the factual elements of invalidity by clear 
and convincing evidence.156 
C.   Obviousness 
Most of the Federal Circuit’s decisions on obviousness do not warrant 
extended discussion because they dealt with case-specific disputes about 
underlying facts.157  This section discusses a few representative cases 
from 2018 addressing interesting fact patterns and legal issues. 
                                               
 150. Id. at 1353–54. 
 151. 879 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 152. Id. at 1337. 
 153. Id. at 1341. 
 154. Id. (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the PTAB’s determination that petitioner did not 
establish a motivation to combine the prior art references); Yeda Research & Dev. Co. 
v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 906 F.3d 1031, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the PTAB’s 
obviousness finding noting that it “do[es] not read Cyclobenzaprine as establishing a 
rigid rule categorically precluding obviousness determinations without pk/pd data”); 
ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 903 F.3d 1354, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(affirming the PTAB’s finding that apparatus claims were obvious because an 
apparatus that is “capable of” performing certain functions may be anticipated by or 
obvious in view of a prior art apparatus that can likewise perform these functions); IXI 
IP, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 903 F.3d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that the 
PTAB’s determination that a PHOSITA reading the applied reference would 
understand that the cellphone is the master of the ad-hoc network and contains the 
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Impax Laboratories Inc. v. Lannett Holdings Inc.158 highlights that 
although obviousness is ultimately a legal question, the lower court’s 
underlying findings of fact often dictate the outcome in the appeal.159  
Lannett contended that the district court erred in concluding the 
claims at issue would not have been obvious based on an erroneous 
finding that the prior art taught away from nasal formulations of 
zolmitriptan.160  Impax responded that the district court did not err 
because it correctly found that a skilled artisan would not have been 
motivated to make nasal formulations of zolmitriptan or have a 
reasonable expectation of success in doing so.161  Based on the record, 
the Federal Circuit held that the court clearly erred in its findings that 
a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to make a zolmitriptan 
nasal spray with a reasonable expectation of success.162  Zolmitriptan’s 
known significant reliance on its active metabolite would have, on balance, 
dissuaded a person of skill in the art from making nasal formulations of 
zolmitriptan.163  Noting that “this case was close,” the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, deferring to the district court in its fact findings.164 
Next, In re Brandt165 involved an appeal from the examiner’s 
obviousness finding during examination.166  The claim at issue 
required that the recited coverboard have a density “less than [six] 
                                               
LUS is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence); Luminara Worldwide, LLC 
v. Iancu, 899 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming the PTAB’s finding of 
obviousness and rejecting argument that the PTAB changed the obviousness argument 
midstream); Sirona Dental Sys. GmbH v. Institut Straumann AG, 892 F.3d 1349, 1353–
54 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming obviousness judgment where substantial evidence 
supported the PTAB’s finding that the combination discloses a limitation in the claims 
and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine 
the references); Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1356–59 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming a non-obviousness judgment where substantial evidence 
supported the PTAB’s finding that the prior art did not teach one element of the 
challenged claims); Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 881 F.3d 894, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(affirming the Board’s obviousness determination for one group of claims because 
“the ‘634 patent’s own description of” the prior art reference supported the PTAB’s 
findings, and that was an “[a]dmission . . . binding on the patentee”). 
 158. 893 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 159. Id. at 1378–79. 
 160. Id. at 1378. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1380–81. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1382 (noting that “this case was close” because the evidence presented 
by both sides was equally compelling). 
 165. 886 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 166. Id. at 1173. 
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pounds per cubic foot.”167  The examiner rejected the claim based on 
a reference disclosing a density between six and twenty-five pounds per 
cubic foot, concluding that it would have been an obvious design 
choice for a skilled artisan to have a coverboard with a density less than 
six pounds per cubic foot.168  The PTAB affirmed the examiner’s 
rejection and determined that the claims were prima facie obvious 
based on the general rule that “when the difference between the 
claimed invention and the prior art is the range or value of a particular 
variable, then a prima facie rejection is properly established when the 
difference in the range or value is minor.”169  The PTAB also found 
that applicant did not rebut the prima facie rejection through 
argument or evidence of unexpected results or teaching away nor did 
applicant show that the low-end range of six pounds per cubic foot had 
any different properties from a coverboard with a lower density of 5.99 
pounds per cubic foot.170 
The Federal Circuit affirmed finding that the PTAB’s factual 
findings underlying the obviousness analysis were supported by 
substantial evidence.171  The court explained one of the procedural 
tools available to an examiner—the prima facie case of 
unpatentability.172  If the examiner establishes a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with rebuttal evidence 
or argument.173  The examiner then considers the evidence as a whole 
before reaching a conclusion on the claims’ patentability under 35 
U.S.C. § 103(a).174  In this case, the court rejected the applicant’s 
argument that the examiner can only find a case of obviousness when 
there is an overlap between the claimed range and prior art range.175  
Here, because the claimed range and prior art range abut one another, 
and the applicant conceded as fact that there is no meaningful 
distinction between the two ranges, the Federal Circuit determined 
that substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s finding that the 
                                               
 167. Id. at 1173–74. 
 168. Id. at 1174. 
 169. Id. at 1175 (quoting Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 
783 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1179. 
 172. Id. at 1175–76. 
 173. Id. at 1176. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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differences in density ranges “could not be smaller.”176  The Federal 
Circuit also rejected the applicant’s teaching away argument that was 
in essence an assertion that there is some criticality to having a 
coverboard density of greater than six pounds per cubic foot because 
applicant failed to introduce any supporting evidence.177 
In ZUP, LLC v. Nash Manufacturing, Inc.,178 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the methodology for considering secondary considerations 
of nonobviousness.179  In its appeal, the patentee, ZUP, argued that the 
district court improperly shifted the burden to prove non-obviousness 
to ZUP.180  The majority “quickly dismissed” this argument and noted 
that Federal Circuit precedent is clear that “the burden of persuasion 
remains with the challenger during litigation because every issued 
patent is entitled to a presumption of validity.”181  The majority then 
found that even when all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of 
ZUP, the “weak evidence of secondary considerations presented here 
simply cannot overcome the strong showing of obviousness.”182  Judge 
Newman dissented and argued that the majority improperly held that 
only three of the four Graham v. John Deere Co.183 factors are considered 
in order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness, and the fourth 
Graham factor is applied only in rebuttal, whereby it must outweigh and 
rebut the first three factors.184  Instead, Judge Newman argued that 
secondary consideration evidence must be considered together with 
the other evidence and not separated out and required to outweigh or 
rebut the other factors.185 
In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V.,186 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the PTAB’s finding that the petitioner failed to prove that the 
challenged claims were obvious because the PTAB applied the wrong 
                                               
 176. Id. at 1177–78. 
 177. Id. at 1178. 
 178. 896 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 179. Id. at 1374. 
 180. Id. at 1373. 
 181. Id. (quoting Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 182. Id. at 1375. 
 183. 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (establishing the four factor test for non-obviousness as 
(1) ascertain the prior art; (2) differentiate the prior art and the claims; (3) ascertain 
the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) take into account any secondary 
considerations of non-obviousness). 
 184. Zup, LLC, 896 F.3d at 1380 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 1381. 
 186. 904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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legal standards for obviousness.187  Specifically, the Federal Circuit found 
that the PTAB erred in concluding that the type of burden-shifting 
framework consistently applied in the Federal Circuit’s overlapping range 
cases was implicitly foreclosed by subsequent cases not addressing this 
framework.188  Neither In re Magnum Oil Tools International, Ltd.,189 nor 
Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc.190 forecloses application 
of this burden-shifting framework in the IPR context.191 
For decades, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor have recognized 
that “where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior 
art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by 
routine experimentation.”192  An application of this principle is that 
“[a] prima facie case of obviousness typically exists when the ranges of 
a claimed composition overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art.”193 
Such an overlap creates a presumption of obviousness that a patentee 
may rebut in several ways.194  That is, where there is a range disclosed 
in the prior art, and the claimed invention falls within that range, the 
burden of production falls upon the patentee to come forward with 
evidence of nonobviousness.195  For example, a modification of a 
process parameter may be patentable if it “produce[s] a new and 
unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree 
from the results of the prior art.”196  A claimed range that demonstrates 
such unexpected results is referred to as a “critical” range, and the 
patentee has the burden of proving criticality.197  A patentee may rebut 
the presumption of obviousness by showing that the prior art taught 
away from the claimed range.198  Additionally, a change to a parameter 
may be patentable if the parameter was not recognized as “result-
                                               
 187. Id. at 999. 
 188. Id. at 1006. 
 189. 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing the precedent of burden-
shifting frameworks and the applicability in IPR cases). 
 190. 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the burden-shifting 
framework could be appropriate in the context of IPR). 
 191. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 904 F.3d at 1002–03. 
 192. Id. at 1006 (citing In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469–70 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Woodruff, 
919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1955)). 
 193. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 904 F.3d at 1006. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1006 (citing Aller, 220 F.2d at 456). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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effective.”199  The factfinder then assesses that evidence, along with all 
other evidence of record, to determine whether a patent challenger has 
carried its burden of persuasion to prove that the claimed range was 
obvious.200  In this case, the presumption of obviousness applied and the 
patentee failed to show any of the means to rebut obviousness.201 
“Incorporation by reference” is a common practice in patent 
drafting that incorporates the disclosure of another document into a 
patent by including a simple reference statement to that document. 
Disputes on the scope of incorporation typically arise when one party 
attempts to rely on the incorporated material to support an 
anticipation or obviousness challenge.  In Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co.,202 
the Federal Circuit addressed an interesting twist on incorporation by 
reference—the effect of incorporation by reference on priority date of 
an asserted patent.  In response to a patent infringement suit, Ford 
filed twenty-five IPR proceedings against Paice, including those that 
led to the six proceedings against two patents at issue in this appeal.203  
The PTAB found that a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) publication, 
in view of a patent to Severinsky, rendered a set of challenged claims 
obvious.204  Paice argued that the PCT publication was not prior art 
because both challenged patents claimed priority to a patent 
application which predated the PCT publication and incorporated the 
Severinsky patent by reference, providing written description support 
for the claims.205  The PTAB rejected these arguments and determined 
that the application did not incorporate Severinsky, and the claims 
therefore lacked written description support.206  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed and found that the language “is incorporated herein by this 
reference” sufficiently incorporated the entire Severinsky patent despite 
other language stating that only portions of Severinsky would be 
applicable to the application’s purportedly new and improved hybrid 
vehicle.207  The court noted that “[t]he applicability of a document’s 
                                               
 199. Id. (citing In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 200. Id. at 1007. 
 201. Id. at 1007–08. 
 202. 881 F.3d 894 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 203. Id. at 899–900. 
 204. Id. at 906.  The “Severinsky” patent is named after Alexei “Alex” Severinsky, a Russian 
inventor who invented and patented the Hyperdrive power-amplified internal combustion 
engine power train.  See About Paice, PAICE, http://www.paicehybrid.com/about (last visited 
May 20, 2019). 
 205. Paice LLC, 881 F.3d at 906. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 907. 
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disclosed features and the incorporation of the document itself are 
distinct concepts.”208  The court remanded for a determination of whether 
the priority patent application, with the Severinsky patent incorporated, 
provided adequate written description support for the claims.209 
D.   Indefiniteness 
One case in 2018 dealt with the issue of indefiniteness.  In Berkheimer 
v. HP Inc.,210 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
determination that the asserted claims were indefinite.211  The claims 
at issue each recited the term “minimal redundancy.”212  Because the 
specification uses inconsistent terminology to describe the level of 
redundancy that the system achieves and neither the claims nor the 
prosecution history add clarity, the Federal Circuit found that it was 
not clear error for the district court to find that a skilled artisan would 
not have known the meaning of “minimal redundancy” with 
reasonable certainty.213  The court stressed that it was not holding that 
“all terms of degree are indefinite,” only that the term “minimal 
redundancy” is indefinite in light of the evidence.214 
E.   Written Description and Enablement 
In 2018, the Federal Circuit addressed a relatively high number of 
cases involving written decision and enablement.  One common fact 
pattern in these 2018 cases used written description to attack priority 
benefit claims.  For example, in D Three Enterprises, LLC v. SunModo 
Corp.,215 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that an 
asserted patent was not entitled to claim priority benefit to its 
provisional because the provisional lacked adequate written 
description support for the claimed subject matter.  In the district 
court litigation, because the accused product was available to the 
public after the filing of the provisional application but before the 
filing of the asserted patents,216  the patentee had to establish priority 
benefit to the provisional application to assert the patents against the 
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accused product.217  To claim priority benefit, a patent application 
must disclose the claimed subject matter “in the manner provided by 
§ 112(a)” which states that “[t]he specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making 
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
[a PHOSITA] to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.”218  
On summary judgment, the district court determined that the asserted 
claims were not entitled to priority benefit of the provisional 
application because they were broader than the invention disclosed in 
the provisional such that they did not meet the written description 
requirement.219  The Federal Circuit affirmed and noted that “[i]t is 
not sufficient for purposes of the written description requirement of 
§ 112 that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the 
art, would lead one to speculate as to the modifications that the 
inventor might have envisioned, but failed to disclose.”220  The court 
also found that the statement in the patent that said “[i]t is therefore 
intended that the following appended claims hereinafter introduced 
are interpreted to include all such modifications, permutations, 
additions and subcombinations are within their true sprit [sic] and 
scope” was merely boilerplate language, insufficient to show adequate 
disclosure of the claims.221 
Written description disputes also arise in cases involving genus-
species claims.  Knowles Electronics LLC v. Cirrus Logic, Inc.222 addressed 
the PTAB’s determination that although the specification disclosed a 
genus, solder pads that are capable of being connected to a board, it 
failed to provide adequate written description support for the claimed 
species, pads that are connectable to a board specifically by using a 
reflow process.223  The Federal Circuit affirmed and found substantial 
evidence supported the PTAB’s determination that the specification 
does not provide adequate written description to allow a person having 
of ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) to recognize the inventor 
invented what is claimed.224  The court also rejected Knowles’s 
contention that PTAB disregarded “the state of the art at the time of 
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 222. 883 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 223. Id. at 1365. 
 224. Id. at 1366. 
1288 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1263 
 
filing” and the “prior art knowledge” that would have demonstrated that 
a PHOSITA knew solder pads were intended to be capable of reflow 
attachment to a user’s board.225  Because of the conflicting views 
presented on the knowledge of a PHOSITA, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the PTAB reasonably found that a PHOSITA would not 
have recognized that the inventor possessed solder pads “configured to” 
connect to a printed circuit board through a reflow process.226 
In addition to interesting legal issues when assessing obviousness, 
claimed ranges are also often subjects of written description disputes.  
In 2018, the Federal Circuit addressed written description support for 
a claimed range General Hospital Corp. v. Sienna Biopharmaceuticals, 
Inc.227  In an interference, the PTAB determined that the application 
lacked written description support and dismissed the interference 
proceeding.228  After construing the term about in the representative 
claim to mean “within 10%,” the PTAB found that none of the 
disclosed values in the application fall within the claimed 10% value.229  
The specification also broadly stated that in an embodiment the 
particles have an optical density of at least “about 1 O.D” but does not 
expressly identify a maximum concentration.230  Where a specification 
discloses a broad range of values and a value within that range is 
claimed, the disclosure must allow one skilled in the art to 
“immediately discern the limitation at issue in the claims.”231  The 
Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence supported the 
PTAB’s determination that the examples provided in the specification, 
including disclosure of a range that only minimally overlapped with the 
claimed range, do not provide written description support for the claim 
term, noting “one cannot disclose a forest in the original application, 
and then pick a tree out of the forest and say here is my invention.”232 
The Federal Circuit addressed enablement in one case in 2018—In 
Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co.233  In this case, the 
Federal Circuit reversed the denial of the defendant’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law that the asserted patent was not enabled 
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 226. Id. 
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as a matter of law.234  “[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent 
must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope 
of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”235  The 
claim at issue in this case recited “a non-single crystalline buffer layer” 
and “a growth layer grown on the buffer layer.”236  The court construed 
“non-single crystalline buffer layer” to encompass polycrystalline, 
amorphous, or a mixture of polycrystalline and amorphous.237  The 
constructions resulted in six permutations for the relationship 
between the growth layer and the buffer layer.238  The enablement issue 
concerned only one of the six permutations—a monocrystalline 
growth layer formed directly on an amorphous buffer layer.239  Because 
experts for both parties agreed that it is “impossible to epitaxially grow 
a monocrystalline film directly on an amorphous structure,” the 
Federal Circuit noted that it could “safely conclude that the 
specification does not enable what the experts agree is physically 
impossible.”240  Because “the specification must enable the full scope 
of the claimed invention,” the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s 
argument that the enabling disclosure of five out of six permutations 
was sufficient.241  The Federal Circuit also rejected the patentee’s 
evidence that others have successfully grown a monocrystalline layer 
directly on an amorphous layer because patentee’s evidence did not 
suggest that these results were accomplished by following the 
specification’s teachings or that achieving these results was within an 
ordinary artisan’s skill as of the patent’s effective filing date.242  Because 
“[t]he inquiry is whether the patent’s specification taught one of skill 
in the art how to make such a device without undue experimentation 
as of the patent’s effective filing date,” the Federal Circuit found that 
the patentee’s evidence was not probative of enablement.243 
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F.   Obviousness-Type Double Patenting 
Obviousness-type double patenting is an equitable doctrine with a 
goal of avoiding an unfair extension of patent term to a patentee. 
Invalidity attacks based on obviousness-type double patenting are rare 
and often involve a detailed analysis of the prosecution history to 
determine whether the one-way or two-way test applies and whether 
the patentee is entitled to benefit of the statutory safe harbor. For 
example, in In re Janssen Biotech, Inc.,244 the Federal Circuit addressed 
the application of the safe harbor provision, 35 U.S.C. § 121,245 in an 
obviousness-type double patenting case.246  The applicant filed the 
patent at issue as a continuation-in-part (CIP) including subject matter 
from its parent application and additional matter from another 
previously filed application.247  However, the patent issued with claims 
directed to subject matter in only the parent application and not to the 
added subject matter.248  The PTO subsequently granted an ex parte 
reexamination finding the claims unpatentable based on obviousness-
type double patenting over three patents.249 
During the reexamination proceeding, Janssen requested that the 
patent specification be amended to delete portions that were not 
present in the parent application so that the patent can be designated 
a divisional of the parent application, rather than a CIP.250  The PTO 
entered the amendments but did not confirm the status of the patent 
as a divisional.251  After determining that the safe harbor provision of 
§ 121 did not apply,252 the examiner determined that the claims were 
unpatentable under the one-way test for double patenting.253  The 
PTAB affirmed the double patenting rejections on appeal.254  The 
threshold issue in the appeal was whether the § 121 safe harbor 
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provision applied and protected the patent from invalidation based on 
the reference patents.255  The Federal Circuit stressed that “aside from 
the original application and the original patent, the protection 
afforded by § 121 is limited to divisional applications and patents 
issued on divisional applications.”256  Here, the applicant voluntarily 
and deliberately filed an application properly designated as a CIP and 
the challenged patent issued from that CIP application, not a divisional 
application as required by the § 121 safe harbor provision.  The 
Federal Circuit held that the patent owner cannot retroactively bring 
the challenged patent within the scope of the § 121 safe harbor 
provision by amending the CIP application during a reexamination to 
re-designate it as a divisional application.257 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the issue of whether the PTAB’s 
application of the one-way test for obviousness double patenting was 
proper.  The one-way test asks whether the “application claims are obvious 
over the patent claims,” whereas the two-way test additionally asks 
“whether the patent claims are obvious over the application claims.”258  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s rejection under the doctrine of 
obviousness-type double patenting, finding that patent owner was not 
entitled to the two-way test for obviousness double patenting.259 
In UCB, Inc. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc.,260 a Hatch-Waxman261 case, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the challenged 
claims were not invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.262  As 
part of the double patenting inquiry, the court construes the claims in 
the earlier and later patents and determines the differences.263  The 
court then determines whether those differences render the claims 
patentably distinct.264  The dispute in UCB centered on how the two-step 
analysis should be applied.  However, the majority found that the asserted 
claims were not invalid under either of the competing approaches 
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because a PHOSITA would not have had reason to modify the earlier 
compound to arrive at lacosamide and would not have had a reasonable 
expectation of success.265  Chief Judge Prost dissented and argued that the 
prior art supported a reasonable expectation of success.266 
III.    INFRINGEMENT 
Many of the Federal Circuit’s infringement cases were routine and 
upheld lower courts factual findings.267  However, several cases 
addressed interesting fact patterns and uncommon points of law.  One 
case, Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics 
America, Inc.,268 addressed the impact on infringement for a product 
that includes an infringing feature that is incapable of being used.269  
At trial, the jury found infringement of both method and system claims 
based on the inclusion of a specific mode in the products, referred to 
as “Mode 3.”270  Because there was no evidence that the accused 
products actually used Mode 3, the Federal Circuit reversed the verdict 
of infringement of the method claims.271  However, the court affirmed 
the judgment of infringement of the apparatus claims because 
infringement of apparatus claims requires that the accused products 
have the ability to perform in Mode 3; it does not require actual use of 
the accused products in Mode 3.272 
Polara Engineering Inc. v. Campbell Co.273 involved the issue of public 
and experiment use of a claimed invention.  In the district court 
proceeding, the jury found that the asserted claims directed to a 
control system for crosswalk stations were not proven to be invalid.274  
However, prior to the priority date of the patent, the patentee tested 
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prototypes satisfying the limitations of the asserted claims.275  Following 
post-trial motions, the district court upheld the jury’s verdict that the 
invention was not invalid based on this public use because substantial 
evidence supported the jury’s finding that the installation of 
prototypes was experimental use necessary to ensure that the invention 
would work for its intended purpose.276  Under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b), “[a] person shall be entitled a patent unless . . . the invention 
was . . . in public use . . . in this country, more than one year prior to 
the date of the application for patent in the United States.”277  
However, “an inventor who seeks to perfect his discovery may conduct 
extensive testing without losing his right to obtain a patent for his 
invention—even if such testing occurs in the public eye.”278  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict and found that “substantial 
evidence supports the jury’s finding of experimental use that negates 
the application of the public use bar.”279  After articulating the factors 
that may be relevant to determining whether a use is experimental,280 
the court noted that because invention relates to public safety, “the 
inventors could reasonably believe that they needed to ensure the 
invention’s durability and safety before being certain that it would 
work for its intended purpose.”281 
In another Hatch-Waman case, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Amneal 
Pharmaceuticals LLC,282 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding of non-infringement and held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for additional 
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samples of the accused product.283  The asserted patent claims involved 
mometasone furoate monohydrate (MFM), which is an ingredient in 
Merck’s Nasonex nasal product.284  In 2014, Amneal filed an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval to market 
a generic nasal spray containing corticosteroid anhydrous mometasone 
furoate,285 and sent Merck a notice letter certifying that its proposed 
product would not infringe the asserted patent claims and that the 
asserted patent was invalid.286  Merck subsequently filed an infringement 
suit against Amneal.287  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
required Amneal to complete a bulk-hold study in which Amneal’s 
commercial batch would be held for a four-day period before being 
packaged into nasal spray bottles.288  Amneal drew samples from the batch 
on the first day (“Day 1 Batch”) and on the fourth day (“Day 4 Batch”).289  
After the bulk-hold study was completed, it mixed a 100 kg commercial 
batch and bottled it for storage (“A Batch”).290  Amneal produced samples 
from the Day 1 Batch to Merck but did not provide samples of either the 
Day 4 Batch or the A Batch.291  The district court did not compel Amneal 
to produce these samples but instead gave Merck the opportunity to prove 
at trial that the Day 4 and A Batch samples were substantively different 
than the Day 1 Batch samples.292  The district court then found that Merck 
failed to carry its burden of proving infringement.293 
The Federal Circuit affirmed.  After noting the question was a close 
one, the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it decided to proceed to trial as opposed to ordering 
additional discovery and delaying trial.294  The court determined that 
the district court took adequate steps to ensure that proceeding to trial 
would not prejudice Merck, including giving Merck the opportunity to 
prove at trial that the Day 4 and A Batch samples were different than 
the Day 1 Batch samples for purposes of infringement.295  Regarding 
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infringement, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district 
court’s fact finding that three Raman peaks were required and that 
Amneal’s ANDA product will not infringe.296 
Because design patents are not usually asserted in patent 
infringement cases, the Federal Circuit does not often issue opinions 
associated with design patents. However, in 2018, the Federal Circuit 
considered the application of prosecution history estoppel in a design 
patent infringement context in Advantech Marketing, Inc. v. Shanghai 
Walk-Long Tools, Co.297  Advantek sued its former manufacturer, Shanghai 
Walk-Long Tools (“Walk-Long”), for infringement of its design patent for 
a portable animal cage.298  The district court granted judgment on the 
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), holding that 
prosecution history estoppel barred Advantek from enforcing its design 
patent against the accused product.299  The Federal Circuit reversed. 
Prosecution history estoppel in a design patent case depends on: 
“(1) whether there was a surrender; (2) whether it was for reasons of 
patentability; and (3) whether the accused design is within the scope 
of the surrender.”300  During prosecution of the patent at issue, the 
examiner required the patentee to elect to prosecute claims to either 
a kennel without a cover or a kennel with a cover.301  Advantek elected 
to prosecute the embodiment of a kennel without a cover.302  Based on 
this prosecution history, the Federal Circuit found that Advantek 
elected to patent the ornamental design for a kennel with a particular 
skeletal structure.303  A competitor selling a kennel embodying the 
patented structure infringes Advantek’s patent, regardless of any extra 
features that the competitor might add to the kennel.304  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that Advantek was not estopped by the prosecution 
history from asserting its design patent against Walk-Long.305 
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IV.    EQUITABLE DEFENSES 
In addition to defenses based on on-infringement and invalidity, a 
party accused of infringement can assert a set of equitable defenses 
based on the conduct of the patentee. These defenses are non-
statutory and are highly fact dependent.  In 2018, the Federal Circuit 
addressed a wide variety of cases involving equitable defenses ranging 
from instances of litigation misconduct to improper conduct during 
prosecution of the asserted patents. 
A.   Unclean Hands 
In Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co.,306 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s holding that Merck could not enforce the two 
asserted patents because its conduct gave it unclean hands.307 
[D]etermination of unclean hands may be reached when 
“misconduct” of a party seeking relief “has immediate and necessary 
relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of the matter in 
litigation,” i.e., “for such violations of conscience as in some measure 
affect the equitable relations between the parties in respect of 
something brought before the court.308 
The doctrine “necessarily gives wide range to the equity court’s use of 
discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant.”309 
Here, the Federal Circuit determined, based on the totality of the 
evidence-supported misconduct, the district court properly found that 
the patentee engaged in pre-litigation business misconduct.310  First, 
Merck violated an agreed upon “firewall” by permitting an employee 
involved in related patent prosecution to participate in a conference 
call with Pharmasset311 representatives discussing the structure of its 
compound for treating Hepatitis C.312  Merck compounded this 
violation by continuing to use this employee in related patent 
prosecutions after the call.313  The evidence supported the district 
court’s finding that the employee’s improperly acquired knowledge of 
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Pharmasset’s compound influenced Merck’s prosecution strategy and 
was directly connected to the present patent litigation.314 
The Federal Circuit also determined that misconduct continued 
into the litigation.315  First, the court found that the employee gave 
intentionally false testimony that he did not participate in the 
conference call.316  Second, the court found that the employee’s 
testimony about the role of the Pharmasset’s compound in its 
prosecution of amended claims was “so incredible as to be 
intentionally false.”317  The Federal Circuit also found no abuse in 
discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the unclean hands 
defense extended to both asserted patents.318  In addition to finding 
that the employee played a key role in the prosecution of both patents, 
the district court concluded that “Merck’s litigation misconduct infects 
the entire lawsuit, including the enforceability of the ‘712 Patent.”319 
B.   Inequitable Conduct 
Inequitable conduct is an equitable issue committed to the 
discretion of the trial court and is, therefore, reviewed by the Federal 
Circuit under an abuse of discretion standard.320  In Energy Heating, 
LLC v. Heat On-the-Fly, LLC,321 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s conclusion that the asserted patent was unenforceable for 
inequitable conduct.322  The patent-at-issue involved a method and 
apparatus “for the continuous preparation of heated water flow for use 
in hydraulic fracturing” (also known as “fracing”).323  The sole inventor 
knew that the patent process required that he file his application 
within one year of the first offer for sale or public use; yet, he did not 
disclose any of his companies sixty-one frac jobs that used the system 
to the PTO during prosecution as potential on-sale or public uses.324  
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err in finding 
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the prior frac jobs were not experimental.  Because the continuation 
patent was issued after the district court’s judgment and had claims 
that were materially different, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by not considering the PTO’s issuance of a continuation 
patent in which the frac jobs were disclosed.325  Finally, the Federal 
Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding there was clear and convincing evidence “the inventor knew 
that the prior frac jobs were material and specifically intended to 
deceive the PTO by not disclosing these jobs.”326 
C.   Laches 
The equitable defenses of laches and equitable estoppel can arise 
when a patent holder delays action against an alleged infringer.  In 
John Bean Technologies Corp. v. Morris & Associates, Inc.,327 the Federal 
Circuit was confronted with intersection of laches and ex parte 
reexamination.  In June 2002, U.S. Patent No. 6,397,622 (“the ‘622 
patent”) issued two claims.328  Shortly after issuance, the defendant sent 
the patent owner a demand letter notifying the patent owner that the 
defendant believed the patent to be invalid and stating that any 
statements that assert infringement made from this point were likely to be 
met with a suit for unfair competition.329  The patent owner did not 
respond to the demand letter.330  In December 2013, eleven years after 
the ‘622 patent was issued, the patent owner filed an ex parte 
reexamination.331  During that proceeding, the patent owner amended 
both of the original claims and added six additional claims.332  After the 
PTO issued a reexamination certificate in 2013, the patent owner sued 
the defendant for infringement from the date the reexamination 
certificate issued.333  The district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant holding that the infringement action was barred by both laches 
and equitable estoppel because the patent owner’s decade-long silence was 
misleading conduct on which the defendant relied, and the defendant 
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would be materially prejudiced if the patent owner was permitted to pursue 
its infringement case.334  The Federal Circuit disagreed and reversed. 
The parties agreed that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in 
SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC,335 
which held “that laches cannot be asserted as a defense to 
infringement occurring within the six-year period prior to the filing of 
a complaint for infringement,” barred Morris & Associates’ laches 
defense,336 leaving only the defense of equitable estoppel.  Because 
amended and issued reexamination claims cannot be broader than the 
original claims, the validity analysis for reexamination claims 
necessarily differs and what constitutes an infringing product can 
change.”337  Because the asserted claims did not exist at, or were 
substantively altered since the time defendant sent patent owner the 
demand letter, the Federal Circuit determined that the patent owner 
“could not have engaged in misleading conduct or silence with respect 
to those claims.”338  The district court’s application of equitable 
estoppel was therefore an abuse of discretion.339 
D.   Implied Waiver 
The conduct of a patentee during interaction with standards setting 
organization can also be the basis of an equitable defense called 
implied waiver. The Federal Circuit considered the scope of implied 
waiver in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.340  The asserted 
patent in this case specifically refers to a version of the General Packet 
Radio Service (GPRS) standard that was being considered by the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) at the time 
of the patent application.341  When ETSI was developing proposals to 
address the problem of propagation delay in GPRS networks, Nokia 
submitted a proposal by the inventor of the asserted patent to ETSI, 
and ETSI initially recommended implementing the proposal in the 
standard.342  Contemporaneously, Nokia filed a Finnish patent 
application based on the invention, to which the asserted patent 
                                               
 334. Id. at 1326–27. 
 335. 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017). 
 336. John Bean Techs. Corp., 887 F.3d at 1324 n.1 (citing SCA Hygiene Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 954). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 1328. 
 339. Id. 
 340. 899 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 341. Id. at 1359. 
 342. Id. at 1365. 
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claimed priority.343  ETSI however subsequently rejected Nokia’s 
proposal.344  Four years later, Nokia disclosed the Finnish patent 
application and the U.S. patent application to ETSI.345 
The court explained that “a participant in a standards-setting 
organization may waive its right to assert infringement claims against 
products that practice the standard.”346  Such a wavier is implied when 
the patentee’s “conduct was so inconsistent with an intent to enforce 
its rights as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been 
relinquished.”347  Conduct supporting implied waiver exists when “(1) 
the patentee had a duty of disclosure to the standard setting 
organization, and (2) the patentee breached that duty.”348  The district 
court determined that Nokia did not have a duty to disclose the Finnish 
application because ETSI rejected Nokia’s proposal.349  The district 
court also stated that “Apple presented no evidence that any ETSI 
member or other entity interpreted Nokia’s failure to disclose the 
patent . . . as evidence that Nokia relinquished its patent rights.”350  The 
Federal Circuit found that none of these reasons supported the district 
court’s conclusion.351  Rather than reversing, the Federal Circuit 
remanded for additional proceedings because it was “possible to interpret 
the district court’s ruling as being based on the conclusion that, because 
Nokia’s proposal was not adopted, no inequitable consequence flowed 
from Nokia’s failure to disclose its patent application.”352 
V.    PATENT OFFICE APPEALS 
Appeals from the PTAB continued to dominant the Federal Circuit’s 
case load in 2018. The Federal Circuit decided 226 PTAB appeals last 
year with most of these cases being appeals from AIA post-grant 
proceedings. Supreme Court decisions issued in early 2018 had the 
potential to dramatically change the practice of invalidation 
proceedings in the United States.  In April, the Supreme Court issued 
                                               
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. (citing Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1347–48 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 1366. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 1367. 
 352. Id. at 1368. 
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its much-anticipated decision on the constitutionality of AIA post-grant 
challenges in Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC.353  In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of inter partes review proceedings. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu354 issued on the same day 
had a dramatic impact on post-grant practice.  In SAS, the Supreme 
Court overruled the PTAB’s practice of partial institution and created a 
ripple effect at the Federal Circuit in cases on appeal having a partial 
institution on either claims or grounds.355  Many of the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions in the second quarter of 2018 addressed procedural issues 
created by the SAS decision.  While the Federal Circuit continued to 
affirm about half of all PTAB appeals in summary affirmances, referred 
to as Rule 36 affirmances, many of the Federal Circuit’s decisions 
addressed unsettled issues of statutory interpretation. 
A.   AIA Post-Grant Proceedings 
1. Jurisdiction and standing 
In § 314(d), Congress explicitly limited the court’s jurisdiction over 
appeals from PTAB institutional decisions.356  That provision states that 
“[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an [IPR] 
under this section shall be final and non-appealable.”357  Since 2015, 
the Federal Circuit broadly applied § 314(d) to deny itself jurisdiction 
over appeals seeking review of the PTAB’s decisions of whether a 
petitioner was statutorily barred under § 315(b).358 
However, in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,359 the court reversed 
course.  The en banc court reconsidered whether § 314(d) prohibits 
review of questions relating to the time bar in view of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of § 314(d) in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee.360  In a 
9–4 decision, the Federal Circuit overruled Achates Reference Publishing, 
Inc. v. Apple Inc.361 and expanded its jurisdiction over PTAB appeals 
relating to the statutory bar of § 315(b).362  The Federal Circuit noted 
                                               
 353. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
 354. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
 355. Id. at 1358. 
 356. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). 
 357. Id. 
 358. See Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 359. 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 360. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367, 1369. 
 361. 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 362. Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1375. 
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that a prohibition on reviewability requires clear indication by 
Congress in view of the strong presumption of reviewability of agency 
action.363  The court interpreted Cuozzo to suggest that § 314(d) only 
forbids review of “determinations closely related to the preliminary 
patentability determination or the exercise of discretion not to 
institute.”364  Finding the statutory bar of § 315(b) unrelated to either 
category, the court held that it had jurisdiction to review PTAB 
determinations related to § 315(b).365  The court has since extended 
this holding to encompass assignor estoppel.366 
The court took on Article III standing in Altaire Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc.367  “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the 
traditional understanding of a case or controversy required by Article 
III.”368  To have standing to challenge the decision of a lower tribunal, 
an appellant “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 
traceable to the challenged [action], and (3) that is likely to be 
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”369  Because inter partes 
reviews can be filed by anyone other than the patent owner, the lack 
of Article III standing can preclude a petitioner from appealing an 
adverse decision of the PTAB. 
In 2011, Altair and Paragon entered into an agreement to pursue 
FDA approval for Altaire’s products, including R-phenylephrine 
hydrochloride products containing a 2.5% and a 10% phenylephrine 
hydrochloride ophthalmic solution.370  Paragon, pursuant to the 
agreement, submitted a new drug application (NDA).371  The FDA 
responded by recommending that Paragon “[c]onsider adding a chiral 
purity test to the d[r]ug product specification.”372  Altaire performed 
the recommended tests and provided a summary of the test results to 
                                               
 363. Id. at 1371–72. 
 364. Id. at 1373.  The en banc court remanded the case to the original panel to 
determine whether the petitioner was time barred.  See id. at 1375. 
 365. Id. 
 366. See Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 908 F.3d 792, 800–01 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (finding that the logic of Wi-Fi One abrogated the court’s previous holding in 
Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. Athena Automation Ltd., 838 F.3d 1236, 1241 
(Fed. Cir. 2016), that assignor estoppel was not reviewable). 
 367. 889 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 368. Id. at 1281 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). 
 369. Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct at 1547). 
 370. Id. at 1278. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
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Paragon who submitted a supplementary NDA filing to the FDA.373  
Paragon later proposed an amendment to the agreement that 
addressed a new patent application filing.374  Altaire responded that 
the formulation, processes, and controls were developed solely by 
Altaire’s CEO and were confidential information of Altaire.375  There 
was no indication in the record that Paragon’s counsel responded to 
Altaire’s substantive comments.376 
In November 2013, Paragon filed a drug patent application, which 
subsequently was issued as U.S. Patent No. 8,859,623.377  In April 2015, 
Altaire filed a complaint against Paragon that alleged breach of a 
nondisclosure clause of the parties’ agreement.378  In May 2015, Altaire 
filed a petition for post-grant review of the challenged patent supported 
by a declaration from its chief executive.379  In its final written decision, 
the PTAB determined that Altaire failed to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the challenged claims would have been obvious and 
that Altaire failed to timely qualify its chief executive as an expert.380  
Subsequently, in April 2017, Altaire filed a complaint seeking a 
declaratory judgment of invalidity of the ‘623 patent.381 
The Federal Circuit found that Altaire sufficiently demonstrated 
imminent harm, noting that Altaire intended to file an ANDA once the 
agreement is terminated and resume marketing its proprietary 
formation of the products and that Paragon refused to stipulate that it 
will not sue Altaire for infringement.382  The Federal Circuit recognized 
that while “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed 
may not occur at all,” under the circumstances here, Altaire’s injury is 
inevitable.383  Because the agreement between the parties prevents 
Altaire from manufacturing its products, the Federal Circuit also 
found that the injury was concrete and particularized.384  Judge Schall 
dissented, disagreeing as to whether Altaire demonstrated imminent 
                                               
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 1279. 
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 380. Id. at 1280. 
 381. Id. at 1279. 
 382. Id. at 1282–83. 
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harm.385  Judge Schall argued that at this point, one of two things will 
happen in the breach of contract suit—either Altaire or Paragon will 
prevail.  If Paragon prevailed, Paragon might have the right to 
terminate the agreement.”386  If Altaire prevailed, the critical linchpin 
of Altaire’s claim of imminent harm—the possibility that Paragon will 
be given the right to terminate the agreement—will have been 
eliminated.387  Judge Schall therefore concluded that a determination 
of imminent harm is speculative and did not warrant a determination 
of Article III standing for Altaire.388 
In another Article III standing case, JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive 
Ltd.,389 the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal by the petitioner, 
JTEKT, because JTEKT lacked Article III standing to appeal.390  JTEKT 
filed an IPR petition against a patent owned by GKN.  In a mixed 
decision, the PTAB found a subset of the challenged claims were not 
proven by JTEKT to be unpatentable.391  Because JTEKT does not have 
a product on the market, to establish Article III standing for an appeal 
of the adverse decision, JTEKT was required to show that “it has 
concrete plans for future activity that creates a substantial risk of future 
infringement or likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of 
infringement.”392  The Federal Circuit found that JTEKT’s evidence 
did not establish that its planned product would create a substantial 
risk of infringement or likely lead to charges of infringement.393  The 
Federal Circuit rejected JTEKT’s argument that IPR estoppel 
“constitutes a separate, and independent, injury in fact,” explaining 
that “estoppel provisions do not constitute an injury in fact when the 
appellant is not engaged in any activity that would give rise to a possible 
infringement suit.”394  However, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Synvina C.V.,395 the Federal Circuit found that DuPont had Article III 
standing despite not facing a specific threat of infringement litigation 
                                               
 385. Id. at 1289 (Schall, J., dissenting). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 1289, 1291. 
 389. 898 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 390. Id. at 1218–19. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 1220–21. 
 393. Id. at 1221. 
 394. Id. (alterations omitted). 
 395. 904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
2019] 2018 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1305 
 
by the patentee because DuPont had taken and planned to take action 
that would have implicated the challenged patent.396 
Finally, in Knowles Electronics LLC v. Iancu,397 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the ability of the PTO to intervene in an appeal to defend 
the PTAB’s ruling after the petitioner departs.  Patent owner, Knowles 
Electronics, appealed from the PTAB’s determination that the claims 
challenged in a reexamination were invalid as anticipated or 
obvious.398  The third-party requester declined to appear and the PTO 
Director intervened “as of right.”399  The majority held that the 
Director of the PTO “has an unconditional statutory ‘right to intervene 
in an appeal from a [PTAB] decision’” under § 143.400  Judge Newman 
dissented, arguing that the PTO does not have authority as intervener 
to litigate when there is no appellee or respondent, unless the director 
has a concrete and particularized interest such as responding to a 
challenge to agency jurisdiction, regulations, or procedures.401  No 
such interest existed in this case.402 
2. Privity and real party in interest 
The AIA prohibits institution of petitions filed more than one year 
after “the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner” 
was served with a complaint.403  For five years, the PTAB had the final 
say on who was a “real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner.”404  
Having expanded its jurisdiction to review PTAB determinations 
relating to the one-year statutory bar in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom 
Corp.,405 the Federal Circuit finally began reviewing the PTAB’s 
statutory interpretation, with mixed results. 
The court’s initial reviews affirmed the PTAB’s privity analyses on 
the narrow ground that they were responsive to the arguments made 
                                               
 396. Id. at 1004–05. 
 397. 886 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 398. Id. at 1371–72. 
 399. Id. at 1379–80. 
 400. Id. at 1372 n.2.  Section 143 provides:  “The Director shall have the right to 
intervene in an appeal from a decision entered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
in a derivation proceeding under section 135 or in an inter partes or post-grant review 
under chapter 31 or 32.”  35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012). 
 401. Knowles Elecs., 886 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 402. Id. 
 403. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
 404. See Achates Reference Publ’g., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), overruled by Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 405. 887 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 826 (2019). 
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by the respective patent owners.406  In Wi-Fi One, the petitioner was 
alleged to have had an indemnification agreement with a party that 
was barred from filing its own petition.407  The PTAB denied discovery 
related to the alleged agreement, stating that indemnity payments 
would not establish privity or control.408  In WesternGeco LLC v. ION 
Geophysical Corp.,409 the appellant was time-barred from filing its own 
petition but was able to join a petition filed by its indemnitor under 
§ 315(c).410  The patent owner argued that the original petitioner, who 
had settled the case before it was decided, was time-barred due to its 
relationship to the appellant.411 
The appellants in both cases argued that the PTAB applied a 
restrictive standard for privity that would require the patent owner to 
prove that the petitioner had control over the related district court 
proceeding that triggered the § 315(b) bar.412  In both cases, the court 
noted that “privy” in § 315(b) carries its common law meaning413 and 
is not limited to control,414 which is but one factor that the Supreme 
Court has given for a finding of privity.415  But it was not improper for 
                                               
 406. See id. at 1337 (“The Board’s decision to focus on [control in its privity analysis] 
was in response to the specific arguments that Wi-Fi raised on the privity issue.”); id. at 
1352 n.2 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“The majority justifies its narrow holding on grounds 
that . . . Wi-Fi limited its argument to the ‘control over the prior litigation’ ground.”); 
see also WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“To the extent the Board analyzed privity based on ION’s control over the PGS 
proceedings, it properly did so in response to WesternGeco’s advancement of a theory 
focusing primarily on control.”), cert. denied, 2019 WL 659884 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019). 
 407. Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1339. 
 408. Id. at 1339–40. 
 409. 889 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 410. See id. at 1314–16. 
 411. See id. at 1316. 
 412. Compare id. at 1320 (addressing WesternGeco’s assertion that “the [PTAB] 
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District Court Litigation in order to find that a District Court Defendant was a real 
party in interest or privy.’”). 
 413. See WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1317; Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1335. 
 414. Compare WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1320 (“We agree with WesternGeco that 
‘control’ is not the exclusive analytical pathway for analyzing privity; as described above, 
it is but one of a variety of considerations.”), with Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1336–37 (“[T]he 
[PTAB] recognized that there are a number of circumstances in which privity might be 
found, including when the nonparty controlled the district court litigation.”). 
 415. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008) (outlining a non-exhaustive list 
of factors which are alone sufficient to establish party and non-party privity in litigation). 
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PTAB to limit its analysis to control where the patent owner had 
limited its argument to that factor.416 
The decision in Wi-Fi One also had a ripple effect, creating an 
opportunity for the Federal Circuit to address the meaning of the term 
“real party in interest” in the context of § 315(b).417  In its Trial Practice 
Guide, the PTAB noted that “[w]hether a party who is not a named 
participant in a given proceeding nonetheless constitutes a ‘real party-
in-interest’ or ‘privy’ to that proceeding is a highly fact-dependent 
question” that is “handled by the Office on a case-by-case basis.”418  In 
practice, the PTAB’s analysis of “real party-in-interest” focused on 
assessing whether the extent of funding and control the non-
participant party exercised in the proceeding.  The Federal Circuit in 
Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp.419 provided a detailed 
discussion for the determination of whether a non-participant is a real 
party-in-interest.  The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB 
applied an unduly restrictive test for determining whether a person or 
entity is a “real party in interest.”420  The court explained that 
“[d]etermining whether a non-party is a ‘real party in interest’ 
demands a flexible approach that takes into account both equitable 
and practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether 
the non-party is a clear beneficiary that has a preexisting, established 
relationship with the petitioner.”421 
The Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO’s statutory interpretation 
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.422 in 
Applications in Internet Time provides insight into the contours of “real 
party in interest.”  Starting with assessing the usage of the term in the 
common law context, the court noted that the inclusion of the “real 
party in interest” and “privy of the petitioner” in § 315(b) makes clear 
that Congress planned for the provision to apply broadly—sweeping in 
not only what might be traditionally known as real parties in interest, 
                                               
 416. See WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1320; Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1337–38. 
 417. Wi-Fi One, 887 F.3d at 1335, 1340. 
 418. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48759 (Aug. 
14, 2012). 
 419. 897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 420. Id. at 1339. 
 421. Id. at 1351. 
 422. 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (establishing a legal formula for determining 
under what circumstances a court should give deference to a government agency in 
interpreting the statutes it administers). 
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but privies as well.423  The court also noted that the statutory language 
bars petitions where proxies or privies would benefit from an instituted 
IPR, even where the petitioning party might separately have its own 
interest in initiating an IPR.424  The court further looked to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), titled “Real Party in Interest,” which 
codified the common law principles for real party in interest.425  
Referencing a note to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 17(a) by the 
Advisory Committee describing the basis for the real-party-in-interest 
rule,426 the Federal Circuit identified two questions:  “(1) what ‘right’ 
is being enforced; and (2) who is ‘entitled’ to enforce that right.”427  In 
the context of IPRs, the court determined that the right being 
enforced “is a petitioner’s right to seek administrative reexamination 
of the patentability of issued claims as an alternative to invalidating 
those claims in a judicial proceeding.”428  On the second question, the 
court assessed how close the relationship between the real party in 
interest and the IPR petitioner must be.429  When it comes to evaluating 
this relationship, the common law seeks to ascertain who, from a 
“practical and equitable” standpoint, will benefit from the redress that 
the chosen tribunal might provide.430  This common law notion applies 
with equal force in the IPR context when a patent owner is dragged 
into an IPR by a petitioner who necessarily has an interest in canceling 
the patent owner’s claims. That patent owner should not be forced to 
defend against later judicial or administrative attacks on the same or 
                                               
 423. Applications in Internet Time, 897 F.3d at 1346–47. 
 424. Id. at 1347. 
 425. Id. at 1347–48.  Rule 17(a) provides that: 
[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, and 
specifies seven categories of individuals who may sue in their own names 
without joining the person for whose benefit the action is brought: (1) 
executors; (2) administrators; (3) guardians; (4) bailees; (5) trustees of 
express trusts; (6) parties with whom or in whose name a contract has been 
made for another’s benefit; and (7) parties authorized by statute. 
Id. (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1545 (3d ed. 2018)). 
 426. Id. at 1348 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 425, § 1545) (“[T]he modern 
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 427. Id. 
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 429. Id. at 1349. 
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related grounds by a party that is so closely related to the original 
petitioner as to qualify as a real party in interest.431 
The Federal Circuit found that nothing suggested Congress 
intended for term to have meaning that departs from its common law 
origins.432  The legislative history indicates that the terms “real party in 
interest” and “privy” were included in § 315 to serve two related purposes: 
(1) to ensure that third parties who have sufficiently close relationships 
with IPR petitioners would be bound by the IPR estoppel provision; and 
(2) to safeguard patent owners from having to defend their patents 
against belated administrative attacks by related parties via § 315(b).433 
The Federal Circuit then found that the PTAB’s determination that 
Salesforce was not a real party in interest under § 315(b) relied on an 
impermissibly narrow understanding of the common law meaning of 
the term.  It also found that the PTAB’s interpretation of the term was 
not based on consideration of the entirety of the administrative record, 
and seemingly misallocated the burden of proof.434  RPX, unlike a 
traditional trade association, is a for-profit company whose clients pay 
for its portfolio of “patent risk solutions,”435 which in turn help paying 
members “extricate themselves from NPE lawsuits.”436  One of RPX’s 
“strategies” for transforming the patent market is “the facilitation of 
challenges to patent validity” to “reduce expenses for [RPX’s] 
clients.”437  The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB erred by not 
considering these and other facts, which, taken together, imply that 
RPX can and does file IPRs to serve its clients’ financial interests, and 
also that a key reason clients pay RPX is to benefit from this practice 
in the event they are sued by a non-practicing entity (NPE).438  The 
court further stressed that RPX bore the burden of persuasion on this 
issue.439  The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s decision and 
remanded for further proceedings.440 
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The Federal Circuit took on burden framework to be used in the 
real-party-in-interest analysis in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc.441  The Federal 
Circuit first stressed that the IPR petitioner bears the ultimate burden of 
persuasion to show that its petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b) 
based on a complaint served on an alleged real party-in-interest more 
than a year earlier.442  Turning to the procedure, the court agreed with 
the PTAB’s practice of accepting an IPR petitioner’s identification of the 
real parties in interest unless and until disputed by a patent owner.443  
However, the court disagreed that this acceptance created a rebuttable 
presumption that shifted the burden of production to the patent owner 
to rebut.444  Instead, the patent owner must “produce some evidence that 
tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party 
in interest.”445  The court explained that “[a] mere assertion that a third 
party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that 
assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.”446 
In this case, the Federal Circuit expressed concerns because the 
PTAB’s statement that it was unpersuaded “that there is sufficient 
evidence that Activision is an unnamed real party in interest for the 
reasons given in the Institution Decision” based on patent owner’s 
arguments implied that the PTAB assumed the burden of persuasion 
rested on patent owner.447  The court was also concerned that the PTAB 
may have relied on attorney argument as evidence that Activision was 
not controlling or funding these IPRs.448  The Federal Circuit therefore 
vacated the final written decisions and remanded the proceeding with 
instructions for the PTAB to weigh the evidence in a manner that places 
the ultimate burden of persuasion on Bungie, the IPR petitioner, and to 
do so in a manner consistent with recent precedent.449 
3. Impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS 
The primary transitional issue that the Federal Circuit had to face 
was whether it had jurisdiction, after SAS, to address appeals involving 
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post-grant proceedings with partial institutions.450  The Federal Circuit 
decided that issue in the affirmative in PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu.451  
The appeal in that case covered final written decisions in three IPRs 
and found certain claims of the challenged patent invalid as 
anticipated and other claims invalid as obvious.452  The PTAB, however, 
did not institute trial on all claims or all grounds set forth in the three 
petitions.453  The Federal Circuit considered whether it had 
jurisdiction to address the IPR appeals in view of SAS and if so, whether 
it may and should decide the appeals and do so without sua sponte 
remanding for the PTAB to address the claims and grounds in the 
petition excluded by the PTAB in the IPRs.454  The Federal Circuit 
concluded that the existence of non-instituted claims and grounds did 
not deprive it of jurisdiction to decide the IPR appeals.455  The court 
determined that the standard for “final agency action” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the PTAB’s decision 
terminated the IPR proceeding as to all claims and all grounds and the 
PTAB made patentability determinations that affect the patent rights 
of patentee.456  Although some of what the PTAB did is now seen to be 
legally erroneous under SAS, legal error does not mean lack of 
finality.457  The Federal Circuit further determined that it need not 
reopen the non-instituted claims and grounds because no party sought 
SAS-based relief in this case.458 
In Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc.,459 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that that it had jurisdiction over the appeal of an IPR in which 
the PTAB instituted trial on fewer than all challenged claims and 
grounds and was not obligated to reopen non-instituted claims or 
grounds.460  Because neither party requested a remand for the PTAB to 
consider non-instituted claims, the court saw no reason to exercise any 
discretion to remand the non-instituted claims or grounds sua sponte.461  
                                               
 450. See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 451. Id. at 1357. 
 452. Id. at 1359. 
 453. Id. at 1358–59. 
 454. Id. at 1359. 
 455. Id. at 1360. 
 456. Id. at 1361 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)). 
 457. Id. at 1362. 
 458. Id. 
 459. 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 460. Id. at 1374. 
 461. Id. 
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The Federal Circuit, in other cases, granted motions by a party to 
remand for the PTAB to consider non-instituted grounds or claims.462 
4. One-year statutory bar 
Under Section 315(b), accused infringers must file any IPR petitions 
against an asserted patent within one-year of service of a complaint 
alleging infringement of that patent.463  In Click-to-Call Technologies, LP 
v. Ingenio, Inc.,464 the Federal Circuit addressed the interpretation of 
the statutory language “served with a complaint alleging infringement 
of a patent.”465  In an en banc footnote, the Federal Circuit reversed the 
PTAB’s interpretation, holding that § 315(b)’s time-bar applies “to bar 
institution when an IPR petitioner was served with a complaint for 
patent infringement more than one year before filing its petition, but 
the district court action in which the petitioner was so served was 
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.”466 
Although the holding is relatively straightforward, the facts of the case 
are more complex and involve transfers of ownership, acquisitions, and 
name changes.  In 2001, the current exclusive licensee of the patent at 
issue filed an infringement action against Keen, which subsequently 
changed its name to Ingenio, Inc.467  Subsequently, the exclusive 
licensee voluntarily dismissed the complaint “without prejudice.”468 
Ingenio was then acquired by AT&T which then sold its interest in 
Ingenio.469  After Click-to-Call acquired the patent, it filed a patent suit 
against Ingenio, which changed its name to YP Interactive LLC.470  In 
May 2013, Ingenio with other petitioners filed an IPR petition 
challenging the asserted claims, and the PTAB rejected Click-to-Call’s 
                                               
 462. See BioDelivery Scis. Int’l, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc., 898 F.3d 1205, 
1207 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (granting opposed motion to remand to consider non-instituted 
claims and grounds); Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., 894 F.3d 1256, 1257–58 (granting 
motion to remand to consider non-instituted ground of obviousness where PTAB 
determined claims to be non-obvious over the instituted ground). 
 463. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012) (“An inter partes review may not be instituted if the 
petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which 
the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint 
alleging infringement of the patent.”). 
 464. 899 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 465. Id. at 1328 (alterations omitted). 
 466. Id. at 1328 n.3. 
 467. Id. at 1325. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. at 1325–26. 
 470. Id. at 1326. 
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contention that the IPR was time-barred by the 2001 complaint against 
Keen in its institution decision.471  In its final written decision, the PTAB 
affirmed its conclusion that petitioners were not barred from filing an 
IPR petition because the initial action was dismissed without prejudice, 
which left the parties in the same legal position as if the underlying 
complaint had never been served.472 
The Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB’s narrow interpretation 
finding that the statutory language “unambiguously precludes” the PTAB 
from instituting an IPR if the petition is filed more than one year after the 
petitioner or real party-in-interest is served with a complaint of patent 
infringement.473  The majority found that section 315(b) is agnostic 
regarding what events transpired after the defendant was served.474  Judge 
Dyk dissented, arguing that the PTAB’s interpretation was correct and 
section 315(b)’s time-bar should not apply.475  Several subsequent Federal 
Circuit decisions relied on Click-to-Call to dismiss several other IPRs.476  
The Click-to-Call decision opens the door to patent owners serving 
and subsequently voluntarily dismissing a complaint without prejudice 
to “start the clock” running against a defendant.  This creates a 
strategic dilemma for a defendant who is no longer under imminent 
risk of patent litigation but has a limited time window to challenge the 
patent at the PTAB. 
5. Tribal sovereign immunity 
Last year also presented the Federal Circuit with the opportunity to 
address a controversial attempt by Allergan to terminate an IPR 
proceeding under the doctrine of tribal immunity by transferring its 
patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe. The case, Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,477 addressed the threshold issue of 
                                               
 471. Id. at 1326–27. 
 472. Id. at 1327. 
 473. Id. at 1333. 
 474. Id. at 1330. 
 475. Id. at 1350 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 476. See Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light, Co., 905 F.3d 1311, 
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding no distinction between an involuntary and voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice, vacating the PTAB’s final written decision, and remanding 
for dismissal), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator 
Guards, Inc., No. 18-999 (U.S. Jan. 31, 2019); Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Iancu, 899 
F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (vacating the PTAB’s final written decision and 
remanding for dismissal of IPR where the petition was filed more than one year after 
the complaint was served, but subsequently voluntarily dismissed without prejudice). 
 477. 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-899 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2019). 
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whether tribal sovereign immunity applies to IPR proceedings.478  
Mylan, Teva, and Akorn each filed IPR petitions against Allergan’s 
Restasis patents.479  The PTAB instituted trial and scheduled a 
consolidated oral hearing.480  Before the hearing, Allergan transferred 
the Restasis patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.481  The Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe subsequently moved to terminate the IPR 
proceedings arguing that it is entitled to assert tribal sovereign 
immunity, and Allergan moved to withdraw from the proceedings.482  
The PTAB denied both motions.483  Allergan and the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe appealed.484 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that tribal sovereign 
immunity cannot be asserted in an IPR proceeding.485  Several factors 
convinced the court that an IPR proceeding was more like an agency 
enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party.486  First, 
the director possesses broad discretion in deciding whether to institute 
review.487  Second, because a petitioner is not required to participate 
in a proceeding, the role of the parties suggests that immunity does 
not apply.488  Third, the PTO procedures in an IPR do not mirror the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.489  In making its decision, the Federal 
Circuit also stressed that it was leaving “for another day” the question of 
whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity 
differently.490  Judge Dyk wrote separately in concurrence “to describe 
in greater detail the history of [IPR] proceedings, history that confirms 
that those proceedings are not adjudications between private parties.”491 
The Saint Regis decision left open the question of whether state 
sovereign immunity still applies in IPR proceedings. To date, the PTAB 
has treated state sovereign immunity differently than tribal sovereign 
immunity and ruled that state universities were shielded from PTAB 
                                               
 478. Id. at 1325. 
 479. Id. 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. 
 482. Id. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. 
 485. Id. at 1329. 
 486. Id. at 1327. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. at 1328. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. at 1329. 
 491. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring). 
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challenges under this doctrine. The reasoning in Saint Regis decision 
indicates that the Federal Circuit may find that state sovereign 
immunity also does not apply in the PTAB.    
6. Motions to amend 
In October 2017, the en banc Federal Circuit in Aqua Products, Inc. 
v. Matal492 held that under the PTO’s current rules, the PTO may not 
place the burden of persuasion regarding the patentability of 
proposed amended claims on the patent owner.493  This decision 
caused a significant change in PTAB procedure which previously 
placed the burden on the patent owner as the moving party to 
demonstrate the patentability of the proposed substitute claims.494  In 
2018, the Federal Circuit addressed several interim cases in which final 
written decisions were issued prior to the en banc decision in Aqua 
Products.  In these cases, the PTAB vacated the PTAB’s denial of the 
motions to amend because they improperly placed the burden on 
patent owners to demonstrate patentability and remanded to the 
PTAB to reconsider in light of Aqua Products.495 
7. Issue preclusion 
MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC496 addressed the application of 
issue preclusion in AIA post-grant proceedings.497  Petitioner, 
MaxLinear, appealed the PTAB’s final written decision, finding that 
the challenged claims were patentable.498  During the pendency of this 
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decision in a separate 
IPR proceeding that held the challenged independent claims to be 
unpatentable over different prior art grounds.499  The Federal Circuit 
held that issue preclusion applied.  The fact that the separate IPR 
became final while the present case was pending on appeal was 
irrelevant.500  The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s finding of 
                                               
 492. 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 493. Id. at 1324–25. 
 494. Id. at 1300. 
 495. See id. at 1356–57. 
 496. 880 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 497. Id. at 1376. 
 498. Id. at 1374. 
 499. Id. 
 500. Id. at 1376 (citing Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Direct Brand 
Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]ssue preclusion applies even 
though the precluding judgment . . . comes into existence while the case as to which 
preclusion is sought . . . is on appeal.”). 
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patentability and remanded for the PTAB to decide whether the 
remaining dependent claims can survive in view of the collateral 
estoppel effect of the finding of unpatentability of the independent 
claims in the previous IPR.501 
In another issue preclusion case, VirnetX Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,502 the 
Federal Circuit found that VirnetX was collaterally estopped by the 
Federal Circuit’s Rule 36 judgment in a related appeal from 
relitigating the question of whether an applied reference was a printed 
publication.503  Apple filed two IPR petitions against the challenged 
claims.504  Both petitions relied on RFC 2401 in a ground of 
unpatentability.505  The PTAB instituted trial in both, and VirnetX filed 
patent owner responses arguing that RFC 2401 was not a printed 
publication.506  The PTAB disagreed and concluded that the 
challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious.507  In a related appeal, 
VirnetX appealed seven final written decisions in which the PTAB 
found that RFC 2401—in combination with other references—
rendered obvious a number of patents related to the challenged patent 
in this case.508  In those cases, VirnetX also argued that RFC 2401 was 
not a printed publication.509  The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed 
the PTAB’s final written decisions pursuant to Rule 36.510  The Federal 
Circuit found that VirnetX was collaterally estopped from relitigating 
the question of whether RFC 2401 was a printed publication because 
that question was necessary and essential to the judgment in the 
related appeal; in fact, it was the only issued raised in that appeal.511 
The Federal Circuit applied collateral estoppel sua sponte in XY, 
LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.512  In the underlying district court case, 
the jury found the challenged claims neither invalid nor infringed.513  
Defendant appealed the district court’s decision, claiming an abuse of 
                                               
 501. Id. at 1377–78. 
 502. 909 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 503. Id. at 1378. 
 504. Id. at 1377. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Id. 
 511. Id. at 1378. 
 512. 890 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 513. Id. at 1288. 
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discretion in determining the invalidity of its claim.514  The asserted 
claims were also challenged in an IPR proceeding.515  The PTAB held 
that a set of claims (the Freezing Patent claims) were unpatentable,516 
and the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s finding of 
unpatentability.517  The court’s majority found that the affirmance of 
an invalidity finding, whether from a district court or the PTAB, has a 
collateral estoppel effect on all pending or co-pending actions.518  The 
Federal Circuit therefore did not address the defendant’s invalidity 
arguments as to the Freezing Patent claims and dismissed the appeal 
of these claims as moot.519  Judge Newman dissented arguing that “due 
process is not served by [the majority’s] sua sponte creation of this 
estoppel on this appeal, without notice to the parties, without briefing, 
and without opportunity to respond.”520 
8. Estoppel 
The scope and extent of the estoppel provisions of the AIA statute 
remained a hotly debated issued in 2018. The Federal Circuit 
addressed one estoppel case in 2018, Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, 
Inc.,521 involving the interplay between statutory disclaimer, adverse 
judgment, and patent owner estoppel.522  Prior to institution, the 
patent owner, Arthrex, statutorily disclaimed all claims challenged in 
the IPR and stated that the filing of the statutory disclaimer was not a 
request for an adverse judgment.523  The PTAB however entered an 
adverse judgment against Arthrex concluding that 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) 
permits the PTAB to construe the statutory disclaimer of all challenged 
claims as a request for adverse judgment, even when the statutory 
disclaimer occurs before the institution decision.524  As a result of the 
                                               
 514. Id. at 1293–94. 
 515. Id. at 1294. 
 516. Id. 
 517. Id. (citing XY, LLC v. ABS Glob., Inc., Appeal No. 16-2228). 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id. at 1295. 
 520. Id. at 1298 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 521. 880 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 522. Id. at 1347. 
 523. Id. 
 524. Id. 
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adverse judgment, patent owner estoppel under 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.73(d)(3)(i)525 attached to Arthrex.526 
The Federal Circuit first addressed the threshold issue of whether 
the adverse final judgment was appealable under 35 U.S.C. § 319527 
since the PTAB did not issue a “final written decision.”528  The majority 
held that the adverse judgment was appealable because 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295 provides the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over “an appeal 
from a decision of—the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to . . . inter partes 
review under title 35” and 35 U.S.C. § 319 “does not cabin” the appeal 
rights conferred by § 1295.529 
The Federal Circuit was split on the issue of whether the PTAB 
properly entered an adverse judgment against Arthrex.530  Rule 
§ 42.73(b) provides that “[a] party may request judgment against itself 
at any time during a proceeding” and lists four actions that may be 
construed by the PTAB as a request for adverse judgment, including 
“cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no 
remaining claim in the trial.”531  The majority held that the PTAB’s 
interpretation is consistent with the rule because “in the trial” can be 
interpreted to mean that there is no claim remaining for trial.532  Judge 
O’Malley wrote separately to highlight that the PTO’s expansive 
definition of “proceeding,” encompassing both the trial and the 
preliminary proceeding, and its practice of issuing adverse judgments 
prior to institution seem to conflict with the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc.,533 that “[t]he 
IPR does not begin until it is instituted.”534  In dissent, Judge Newman 
disagreed with the majority’s interpretation arguing that because all 
                                               
 525. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3)(i) (2018) precludes a patent owner “from taking 
action inconsistent with the adverse judgment including obtaining in any patent . . . 
[a] claim that is not patentably distinct from a finally refused or canceled claim.” 
 526. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1347. 
 527. 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012) (“A party dissatisfied with the final written decision of the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board under section 318(a) may appeal the decision pursuant 
to sections 141 through 144.”) (emphasis added). 
 528. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1348. 
 529. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)). 
 530. Id. at 1349–51. 
 531. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) (2018). 
 532. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1350.  Rule 42.2 defines “trial” as requiring “a contested 
case instituted by the Board based upon a petition.”  37 C.F.R. § 42.2. 
 533. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 534. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1351 (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
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challenged claims were disclaimed before the PTAB instituted trial, the 
PTAB’s authority to render adverse judgment did not arise.535 
9. Due process and procedural requirements 
Arguments that the PTAB violated due process or procedural 
requirements536 of the APA continued to take center stage in Federal 
Circuit cases in 2018.  Many of these cases address the PTAB’s handling 
of evidence and arguments, particularly the difficult issue of whether 
evidence and argument presented in a petitioner’s reply is 
impermissible. In Altaire Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc.,537 
the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB violated the APA by refusing 
to consider patentee’s expert testimony and test data.538  In May 2015, 
Altaire filed a petition for post-grant review of the challenged patent 
supported by a declaration of its chief executive, Mr. Al Sawaya.539  In 
its patent owner response, Paragon challenged the declaration as not 
satisfying the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(b).540  In its reply, 
Altaire included a second declaration from Mr. Al Sawaya discussing 
his experience and providing additional information regarding how 
the testing was performed.541  The PTAB determined that Altaire failed 
to timely qualify Mr. Al Sawaya as an expert and that Altaire’s test data 
were entitled no weight.542 
The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB abused its discretion 
by failing to consider Mr. Al Sawaya’s testimony.543  Because Paragon 
challenged Mr. Al Sawaya’s qualifications and knowledge of test results 
in its response, it was proper for Altaire to submit a second declaration 
responding to the arguments raised in the patent owner response.544  
                                               
 535. Id. at 1355–56 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 536. See, e.g., Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–
39 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (rejecting argument that Board violated the APA by changing claim 
construction theories midstream without providing parties an opportunity to respond). 
 537. 889 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 538. Id. at 1284. 
 539. Id. at 1279. 
 540. Id. at 1280.  Rule 42.65(b) requires a party that relies on a technical test or data from 
such a test to “provide an affidavit explaining: (1) [w]hy the test or data is being used; (2) [h]ow 
the test was performed and the data was generated; (3) [h]ow the data is used to determine a 
value; (4) [h]ow the test is regarded in the relevant art; and (5) [a]ny other information 
necessary for the [PTAB] to evaluate the test and data.”  Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. 42.65(b) (2018)). 
 541. Id. 
 542. Id. 
 543. Id. at 1285. 
 544. Id. 
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The Federal Circuit noted that the PTAB could have granted Paragon 
a sur-reply, rather than refuse to consider Mr. Al Sawaya’s declaration.545  
The Federal Circuit also determined that the PTAB abused its discretion 
by refusing to consider evidence regarding the test data and testing 
method.546  The Federal Circuit remanded for the PTAB to consider Mr. 
Al Sawaya’s declaration and reconsider the test data.547 
Next, Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC548 involved the appeal of a remand 
determination by the PTAB in an IPR proceeding.549  In the underlying 
IPR, the PTAB relied on a new argument and evidence presented by 
Dell for the first time at oral argument, without providing Acceleron 
an opportunity to respond.550  The PTAB confirmed the validity of a 
set of claims and cancelled the remaining claims as either anticipated 
or obvious.551  Both parties appealed and the Federal Circuit remanded, 
among other reasons, on grounds that the PTAB erred when it failed to 
give Acceleron an opportunity to respond.552  On remand, the PTAB 
decided to not consider the newly raised “slides” argument during oral 
argument due to it being new and non-responsive. The PTAB further 
held that the claim presented was not anticipated.553 
Dell argued that the PTAB’s failure to consider its argument was 
contrary to Federal Circuit precedent and the remand order.554  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the PTAB’s decision, finding 
that precedent did not compel the PTAB to consider Dell’s new 
evidence and “[u]nless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 
37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the PTAB was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely 
argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for 
the first time during oral argument.”555  Regarding Dell’s second 
argument, the Federal Circuit stated that the remand order did not 
order PTAB to consider Dell’s new argument and Acceleron’s 
response, but set out the requisite procedures that would apply had 
the PTAB actually considered Dell’s evidence.556  The Federal Circuit 
                                               
 545. Id. 
 546. Id. at 1286–87. 
 547. Id. 
 548. 884 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 549. Id. at 1365. 
 550. Id. 
 551. Id. at 1367. 
 552. Id. at 1365. 
 553. Id. at 1368. 
 554. Id. at 1369. 
 555. Id. 
 556. Id. 
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also rejected Dell’s public policy argument holding that due process 
and preserving the PTAB’s discretion outweigh any negative effects of 
not invalidating a patent claim.557 
In Anacor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Iancu,558 the Federal Circuit 
addressed APA and due process arguments in the context of post-grant 
proceedings.  Anacor argued that the PTAB’s final written decision 
violated the APA and due process for two reasons:  first, the PTAB 
adopted a new theory of unpatentability presented in petitioner’s reply 
without giving Anacor notice and opportunity to respond; and second, 
the petitioner impermissibly relied on new evidence not included in 
the petition to satisfy burden of showing prima facie case of 
obviousness.559  The Federal Circuit rejected the first argument 
because the PTAB based its decision on the same references and 
inferences proposed in the petition.”560  The Federal Circuit rejected 
the second argument as well, noting that there is “no blanket 
prohibition against the introduction of new evidence during an inter 
partes review proceeding” and in this case, Anacor had ample notice 
and opportunity to respond to the new reference which were properly 
offered in reply to arguments made by Anacor and for purpose of 
showing state of the art at the time of the patent application.561 
In Yeda Research & Development Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,562 the 
Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner’s argument that its due 
process rights and the APA were violated because it did not have notice 
of, and an opportunity to respond to, a reference introduced for the 
first time in the reply declaration of petitioner’s expert.563  Under 
Genzyme Therapeutic Products LP v. Biomarin Pharmaceutical Inc.,564 “the 
introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected 
in [IPR] trial proceedings and, as long as the opposing party is given 
notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it, the 
introduction of such evidence is perfectly permissible under the 
APA.”565  In Yeda, the patent owner received notice because the 
reference was provided with petitioner’s reply, and patent owner 
                                               
 557. Id. at 1370. 
 558. 889 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 559. Id. at 1379–80. 
 560. Id. at 1380. 
 561. Id. at 1380, 1382. 
 562. 906 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 563. Id. at 1040. 
 564. 825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 565. Id. at 1366. 
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deposed petitioner’s expert, including questioning the expert about 
the reference at issue.566  Further, the patent owner could have 
addressed the reference at oral argument or sought leave to file a sur-
reply to respond but did not take either action.567  The patent owner 
also argued that PTAB erred in considering the reference when 
assessing “knowledge, motivations, and expectations of a PHOSITA 
regarding the prior art because the reference did not qualify as prior 
art.”568  The Federal Circuit disagreed noting that the PTAB has 
recognized that non-prior art evidence of what was known “cannot be 
applied, independently, as teachings separately combinable” with other 
prior art.  However, this evidence “can be relied on for their proper 
supporting roles, e.g., indicating the level of ordinary skill in the art, 
what certain terms would mean to one with ordinary skill in the art, and 
how one with ordinary skill in the art would have under-stood a prior art 
disclosure.”569  The Federal Circuit therefore found that the PTAB did 
not violate the APA or patent owner’s due process rights.570 
Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC571 addressed the scope of the 
PTAB’s ability to strike arguments included in a petitioner’s reply.572  
In its final written decision, the PTAB found that Ericsson had not 
proven the challenged claims were unpatentable because the asserted 
reference only taught one type of interleaving, interleaving R-blocks 
within an S-block as opposed to the interleaving of packets with other 
packets within a packet block.573  In reaching its decision, the PTAB 
rejected portions of Ericsson’s reply that argued to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art, the difference between the disclosed and 
claimed interleaving was insubstantial given that interleaving packets 
together was known in the art, holding that this was a new theory 
beyond the scope of a proper reply.574  The Federal Circuit disagreed, 
finding that Ericsson’s arguments “merely expand[ed] on a previously 
argued rationale as to why the prior art disclosures are insubstantially 
distinct from the challenged claims,” and did not constitute a new 
                                               
 566. Yeda, 906 F.3d at 1040 (pointing to multiple references which gave notice). 
 567. Id. 
 568. Id. at 1041. 
 569. Id. (citing Dominion Dealer Sols., LLC v. AutoAlert, Inc., No. IPR2014-00684, 
2014 WL 5035359, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2014)). 
 570. Id. at 1040, 1042. 
 571. 901 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 572. Id. at 1379–80. 
 573. Id. at 1378–79 (noting that packets are a specific nomenclature for the ‘831 patent). 
 574. Id. 
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rationale.575  The Federal Circuit further stressed that its decision 
“should not be viewed as changing or challenging PTAB’s practice of 
limiting the scope of replies pursuant to its regulations.”576 
B.   Reexamination 
Prior to the advent of the AIA post-grant proceedings in September 
2012, a party could challenge the validity of certain patents in inter 
partes reexamination proceedings.  One issue that arises from 
reexaminations and other PTO invalidation proceedings is the extent 
to which a jury can be made aware of the details of the PTO 
proceeding.  In 01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc.,577 
the Federal Circuit addressed the use of testimony regarding a 
reexamination proceeding during the district court trial.578  The 
district court stayed the litigation pending resolution of a request for 
inter partes reexamination filed in March 2008 against the asserted 
patent by Citrix.579  In October 2013, the PTAB confirmed the 
patentability of the asserted claims over various prior art references,580 
and the Federal Circuit affirmed.581  The district court denied Citrix’s 
motion to exclude evidence pertaining to the PTO reexamination 
proceedings and held that the reexamination could be used in a 
limited manner at trial, but Citrix could not be identified as the party 
that requested the reexamination because “it would be unfairly 
prejudicial to Citrix to attribute the reexamination request to Citrix or 
to indicate that it was Citrix that advanced certain arguments in the 
reexamination process.”582  The district court was concerned that the 
jurors might put undue weight on the fact that Citrix advanced 
arguments that were rejected by the PTAB, even though the PTAB uses 
a different standard and does not have the benefit of the full array of 
evidence that would be presented to the jury.583  The Federal Circuit 
held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the 
                                               
 575. Id. at 1381. 
 576. Id. at 1380 (explaining that the Board’s discretion to reject arguments not 
raised in before the reply brief). 
 577. 889 F.3d 735 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 578. Id. at 744. 
 579. Id. at 738. 
 580. Id. 
 581. Id.; see also Citrix Sys., Inc. v. 01 Communique Lab., Inc., 581 F. App’x 900 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (affirming the lower court’s holding). 
 582. 01 Communique Lab., 889 F.3d at 739. 
 583. Id. 
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PTO reexamination record to be used and not informing the jury 
about the Citrix party that requested the reexamination.584 
C.   Anticipation and Obviousness 
Most of the 226 PTAB appeal decisions issued in 2018 dealt with 
reviewing the PTAB’s findings on anticipation or obviousness.  
Anticipation is a question of fact.  Obviousness is a question of law 
based on underlying factual findings, including the scope and content 
of prior art references and the existence of a reason to combine those 
references.  The Federal Circuit reviews agency findings of fact for 
support by substantial evidence in the agency record, and agency 
rulings of law are reviewed for correctness in accordance with law.585  
Most of the Federal Circuit’s decisions do not warrant extended 
discussion because they dealt with case-specific disputes about 
underlying facts. In the majority of these cases, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the PTAB’s decision.586  However, the Federal Circuit did 
vacate the PTAB’s decision in a few cases.587  Several PTAB decisions 
fell short of the requirement that the PTAB “explicate its factual 
conclusions, enabling the [Federal Circuit] to verify readily whether 
those conclusions are indeed supported by ‘substantial evidence’ 
contained within the record.”588 
In re Hodges589 was a rare case in which the Federal Circuit reversed 
the PTAB, rather than vacating and remanding for further 
proceedings.590  During prosecution, the examiner rejected the claims 
                                               
 584. Id. at 744. 
 585. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 586. See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding 
that substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s finding of motivation to combine); 
Anacor Pharm., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming 
obviousness determination because substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s 
finding that a PHOSITA would have expected compounds at issue would share 
activities, such as inhibition of fungi); Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 884 F.3d 
1352, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that other factual determinations should be 
included); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(affirming obviousness determination based on Board’s claim construction). 
 587. See Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., 884 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (vacating the PTAB’s nonobviousness decision and remanding where claim 
construction determined to be erroneous). 
 588. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1314; see also Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 
1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the PTAB’s reasoning must be set out “in 
sufficient detail to permit meaningful appellate review”). 
 589. 882 F.3d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 590. Id. at 1109. 
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as anticipated by the Rasmussen reference, the Frantz reference, and 
as obvious over the combination of Rasmussen and Frantz.591  The 
Federal Circuit found that the PTAB’s anticipation determinations 
based on Rasmussen and Frantz were unsupported by substantial 
evidence and reversed both decisions.592  Regarding Rasmussen, the 
court reversed the PTAB’s determination because the only finding 
supported by substantial evidence in Rasmussen pertains to the claim 
limitation at issue.593  After finding that the PTAB’s construction of 
“signal” was unreasonably broad, the court reversed the PTAB’s 
determination on the Frantz rejection because the only permissible 
factual finding was that Frantz did not disclose a “signal” under an 
reasonable construction—a position supported by the PTO’s refusal to 
defend the PTAB’s Frantz determination on appeal.594  Finding that 
the “obviousness determinations involved ‘potentially lawful but 
insufficiently or inappropriately explained’ factual findings,” the 
Federal Circuit vacated the obviousness determination and remanded 
for further factual findings and explanation.595 
Judge Wallach, writing separately, concurred in the decision to 
reverse the Frantz and obviousness decisions but dissented with respect 
to the Rasmussen decision because “the majority goes too far in 
reversing the PTAB’s anticipation finding.”596  The dissent noted that 
Federal Circuit precedent has identified two “rare circumstances”597 
where the Federal Circuit may reverse the PTAB’s ultimate 
patentability determinations:  when the PTAB has committed legal 
error and no further factual findings are required and when the PTAB 
made erroneous factual findings and “only one permissible factual 
finding” exists.598  The dissent argued that by departing from the 
default rule that deficient agency decisions should be vacated and 
remanded, the majority improperly acted as the factfinder.599 
                                               
 591. Id. at 1110–11 (referring to the two patents at issue in the case, the Rasmussen 
and the Frantz, which together render all claims obvious). 
 592. Id. at 1112–13. 
 593. Id. at 1113–14. 
 594. Id. at 1115–16. 
 595. Id. at 1117. 
 596. Id. at 1117 (Wallach, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 597. Id. at 1118 (citing Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 598. Id. (citing Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 599. In re Hodges, 882 F.3d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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The Federal Circuit addressed the reliance on “ordinary creativity” 
or “common sense” during obviousness inquiries in DSS Technology 
Management, Inc. v. Apple Inc.600  Noting that common sense and 
common knowledge have their proper place in the obviousness inquiry 
if explained with sufficient reasoning, the court stressed that “there are 
at least three caveats to note in applying ‘common sense’ in an 
obviousness analysis.”601  First, common sense is typically invoked to 
provide a known motivation to combine, not to supply, a missing claim 
limitation; second, common sense is invoked to fill in a missing 
limitation only when “the limitation in question was unusually simple 
and the technology particularly straightforward”; third, “references to 
‘common sense’—whether to supply a motivation to combine or a 
missing limitation—cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for 
reasoned analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing 
with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified.”602  In 
this case, the Federal Circuit found that the requisite reasoned analysis 
and evidentiary support was not present.603  The court then reversed 
rather than vacating and remanding because the only proffered 
evidence, the testimony of Apple’s expert, was conclusory and 
unspecific and the court could not glean a more reasoned explanation 
from the record.604  Judge Newman dissented and argued that the 
PTAB’s decision was adequately explained, and regardless, the proper 
remedy was remand and “not [cementing] this inadequacy into a final 
judgment for the opposing party.”605 
Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC606 was another case where the 
Federal Circuit reversed the PTAB’s invalidity determinations, rather 
than vacating and remanding.607  The PTAB ruled that the challenged 
independent claim was neither anticipated nor obvious because the 
petitioner had “not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that any of claims 1–16” were anticipated or obvious over the 
applied prior art reference.608  The PTAB did not separately analyze 
                                               
 600. 885 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 601. Id. at 1374 (citing Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 602. Id. 
 603. Id. at 1376–77. 
 604. Id. at 1377. 
 605. Id. at 1377–78 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 606. 890 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 607. Id. at 1349 (vacating and remanding the remaining claims at issue). 
 608. Id. at 1340. 
2019] 2018 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1327 
 
the challenged dependent claims.609  The Federal Circuit found that 
the PTAB’s determinations were not supported by substantial 
evidence.610  Specifically, the court held that the testimony of 
Intellectual Ventures’ expert’s contradictory statements in the 
reference were unsupported opinions and therefore “not substantial 
evidence.”611  Judge Wallach dissented and argued that “[t]he majority 
improperly steps out of the appellate role and substitutes its own 
interpretation of the evidence for the PTAB’s.”612 
In Polaris Industries, Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc.,613 the Federal Circuit 
vacated the PTAB’s obviousness determination as to a set of claims 
because “the PTAB’s analysis of these claims was inadequate.”614  The 
court found that the PTAB’s analysis applied an improper framework 
to assess patentee’s teaching away argument, specifically improperly 
disregarding teachings of a reference as ill-defined “subjective 
preferences,” focusing on what a skilled artisan would have been able to 
do, rather than what a skilled artisan would have been motivated to do 
and encouraging the fact-finder to discard evidence relevant to 
teaching-away and motivation to combine.615  On remand, the court 
instructed the PTAB to analyze whether the reference teaches away from 
the claims “under the framework that our case law has articulated.”616 
In re Durance617 also involved an appeal of the examiner’s rejection 
during prosecution.618  However, Durance addressed PTO procedure 
during examination and appeal.  After the examiner issued a final 
rejection of the claims as obvious, the applicant appealed the rejection 
to the PTAB.619  In the examiner’s answer, the examiner set forth a new 
structural-identity argument but did not designate the argument as a 
new ground of rejection.620  The applicant challenged the examiner’s 
rejections of the structural identity.621  The PTAB affirmed the 
                                               
 609. Id. 
 610. Id. at 1346. 
 611. Id. 
 612. Id. at 1354 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (noting that the proper inquiry considers 
whether substantial evidence supported the finding). 
 613. 882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 614. Id. at 1067, 1074. 
 615. Id. at 1068–69. 
 616. Id. at 1070. 
 617. 891 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 618. Id. at 997. 
 619. Id. 
 620. Id. at 998. 
 621. Id. at 999. 
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examiner’s obviousness rejection and disregarded applicant’s reply 
brief arguments finding that the arguments did not respond to 
arguments raised in the answer.622  The Federal Circuit disagreed and 
found that if the examiner’s answer included arguments raised for the 
first time; an applicant may address those in its reply.623  Here, the 
applicant’s reply brief was responsive to the examiner’s answer and 
included citations indicating the new arguments to which the 
applicant was responding.624  The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s 
decision and remanded for the PTAB to consider the arguments made 
in the reply brief.625 
Secondary considerations were also at issue in several PTAB appeals 
decided in 2018.  In Polaris Industries, Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc.,626  the 
Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s finding of obviousness of a set of 
claims because the PTAB improperly rejected its unrebutted evidence 
of commercial success.627  The patentee provided evidence that its 
product, covered by the claimed invention, was a commercial 
success.628  When the patentee shows that the asserted objective 
evidence is tied to a specific product and that product “embodies the 
claimed features, and is coextensive with them,” the court presumes a 
nexus between the commercial success and the claims.629  In this case, 
the PTAB refused to give substantial weight to the patentee’s 
undisputed evidence because it characterizes the evidence as 
conclusory.630  The Federal Circuit instructed the PTAB to assess the 
import of patentee’s evidence on remand “after presuming that a 
nexus between the claims and the commercial success” of the product 
exists, unless and until that presumption is adequately rebutted.631 
1. Printed publication 
One ancillary issue that often arises in prior art challenges is whether 
the petitioner has adequately established that the asserted reference is 
a printed publication.  Many of the Federal Circuit’s anticipation and 
                                               
 622. Id. 
 623. Id. at 1001–02. 
 624. Id. at 999. 
 625. Id. at 1003 (outlining the arguments the PTAB must address). 
 626. 882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 627. Id. at 1071–73. 
 628. Id. 
 629. Id. at 1072. 
 630. Id. (detailing the evidence that the PTAB refused to fully consider). 
 631. Id. at 1073. 
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obviousness decisions involving non-patent literature such as catalogs, 
conference presentations, and technical reports turned on this issue.  
GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC632 addressed the issue of whether 
a prior art product catalog was a printed publication.633  In its final 
written decision, the PTAB determined that the 2009 GoPro Catalog, 
asserted as prior art, did not qualify as a prior art printed publication 
and therefore the petitioner failed to establish that the challenged 
claims were unpatentable.634  The petitioner provided evidence that 
the GoPro Catalog was distributed at the Tucker Rocky annual dealer 
trade show, attended by vendors and dealers.635  The PTAB concluded 
that petitioner did not establish “that the GoPro Catalog was 
disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons 
interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art and 
exercising reasonable diligence could have located it.”636  Specifically, 
a “person ordinarily skilled in the art would not be interested in the 
dealer show because it was not an academic conference or camera 
industry conference, but rather a dealer show for action sports vehicles 
like motorcycles, motorbikes, ATVs, snowmobiles, and watercraft.”637  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the “case law regarding 
accessibility [was] not as narrow as the PTAB interprets it.”638  The 
Federal Circuit noted that “the GoPro Catalog was disseminated with 
no restrictions and was intended to reach the general public.”639  
Because trade shows, like conferences, are “directed to individuals 
interested in the commercial and developmental aspects of 
products,”640 the Federal Circuit reasoned that “The fact that the 
dealer show is focused on action sports vehicles is not preclusive of 
persons ordinarily skilled in the art from attending to see what POV 
digital cameras were being advertised and displayed.”641  The court 
found that, based on the record evidence, the petitioner met the 
burden of proving that the GoPro Catalog was a printed publication.642  
                                               
 632. 908 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 633. Id. at 691. 
 634. Id. at 693. 
 635. Id. at 692. 
 636. Id. at 693. 
 637. Id. at 694. 
 638. Id. 
 639. Id. at 695. 
 640. Id. at 694. 
 641. Id. at 695. 
 642. Id. at 694. 
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Because the PTAB did not consider the merits of the obviousness 
claim, the PTAB vacated and remanded.643 
The issue of public availability of a catalog was addressed by the 
Federal Circuit again in Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc.644  
The court noted that “[b]ecause there are many ways in which a 
reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public 
accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a 
reference constitutes a ‘printed publication.’”645  To support the public 
accessibility of the catalog, petitioner provided the International Trade 
Commission testimony of the inventor who testified that he distributed 
the catalog at the International Dental Show conference in March 
2003 without requiring a confidentiality agreement.646  The petitioner 
also submitted two declarations to corroborate the testimony of the 
inventor; one of the declarants both received and retained a copy of 
the catalog in his files.647 “Corroboration is required of any witness 
whose testimony alone is asserted to invalidate a patent, regardless of 
his or her level of interest.”648  Sufficiency of corroboration in prior 
invention or public use cases is assessed based on a number of factors 
including, for example, the relationship between the corroborating 
witness and the alleged prior user, the time period between the event 
and trial, and the interest of the corroborating witness.649  The Federal 
Circuit found that the petitioner’s corroboration was legally sufficient 
and rejected the argument that the testimony of one witness cannot be 
corroborated by the testimony of another witness.650  The date on the 
catalog matched the date the witnesses testified it was publicly 
available, and this constituted further corroboration of public 
accessibility as of that date.651  The Federal Circuit determined that 
substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s finding that the catalog was 
publicly accessible prior to the critical date of the challenged patent.652 
                                               
 643. Id. at 695–96. 
 644. 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 645. Id. at 1375 (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 646. Id. at 1371–72. 
 647. Id. at 1372–73, 1376. 
 648. Id. at 1377–78 (quoting Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alteration omitted)). 
 649. Id. at 1378. 
 650. Id. 
 651. Id. at 1378–79. 
 652. Id. at 1376. 
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In Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry,653 the Federal Circuit addressed the issue 
of whether a video demonstration and slide presentation presented to 
spinal surgeons at various industry meetings and conferences were 
“printed publications.”654  The PTAB found that the video and slides were 
not prior art.655  The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s determination 
and found that the PTAB did not fully consider all the relevant factors 
such as the size and nature of the meetings, whether the meetings were 
open to people interested in the subject matter of the material disclosed, 
and whether there was “an expectation of confidentiality between the 
distributor and the recipients of the materials.”656 
Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC657 addressed 
whether FDA advisory committee “materials were sufficiently accessible 
to the public to constitute prior art.”658  The obviousness grounds 
presented by petitioner in the six IPR proceedings at issue in this case 
relied on four documents, collectively referred to as the Advisory 
Committee Art (ACA materials): “(1) the FDA advisory committee 
meeting transcript and slides; (2) an FDA preliminary clinical safety 
review of Xyrem®; (3) a Xyrem® briefing booklet; and (4) a video and 
transcript regarding a proposed distribution system for Xyrem®.”659 
The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the 
PTAB’s finding that the ACA materials were publicly accessible.660  
First, the notice in the Federal Register, a reference that those of 
ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to examine, widely 
disseminated the ACA materials through a hyperlink to a public FDA 
website where the ACA materials were accessible.661  Second, “the ACA 
materials were available online for a substantial time before the critical 
date of the patents in suit.”662  Third, “the ACA materials were distributed 
via public domain sources with no possible expectation that the materials 
would remain confidential or not be copied.”663  The Federal Circuit 
                                               
 653. 891 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 654. Id. at 1379. 
 655. Id. 
 656. Id. at 1382–83. 
 657. 895 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 658. Id. at 1351. 
 659. Id. at 1350–52. 
 660. Id. at 1356. 
 661. Id. at 1357–58. 
 662. Id. at 1358. 
 663. Id. 
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further noted “if accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to show 
that particular members of the public actually received the information.”664 
Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc.665 addressed the public 
accessibility of a technical report loaded on the website of a 
university.666  The parties did not dispute that the report had been 
uploaded to the university’s Computer Science and Engineering 
Technical Reports Library’s website prior to the critical date.667  The 
dispute focused on whether the technical report was publicly 
accessible.668  “‘[P]ublic accessibility’ requires more than technical 
accessibility.”669  Because there was no evidence that the report was 
disseminated to the public, “the PTAB focused on whether an 
interested skilled artisan, using reasonable diligence, would have 
found” the report on the Technical Reports Library website.670  “The 
website allowed a user to view a list of technical reports indexed only 
by author or year.”671  This evidence suggests that an artisan may have 
located the report by skimming through potentially hundreds of titles, 
most containing unrelated subject matter.672  Because the technical 
report was not indexed in a meaningful way and the website’s advanced 
search form was deficient, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did 
not err in finding that the report was not publicly accessible and 
therefore not a printed publication.673 
2. Priority benefit 
The issue of properly claiming priority benefit arises in several 
contexts in PTAB proceedings. For example, a petitioner often must 
establish benefit to an earlier application to use the prior application’s 
filing date to support a proposed ground of unpatentability. Similarly, 
a patent owner may attempt to establish priority benefit to an earlier 
application to avoid a prior art rejection. A petitioner may also attack 
a patent owner’s priority benefit claim in order to use a prior art 
reference that pre-dates the patent’s filing date but post-dates the 
                                               
 664. Id. at 1360 (citing Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (alterations omitted)). 
 665. 908 F.3d 765 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 666. Id. at 772–74. 
 667. Id. at 773. 
 668. Id. 
 669. Id. 
 670. Id. 
 671. Id. 
 672. Id. 
 673. Id. 
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earlier application. The Federal Circuit addressed a wide range of 
priority benefit issues in 2018. 
In Droplets, Inc. v. E*TRADE Bank,674 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
PTAB’s finding that the challenged patent was not entitled to the 
benefit of a provisional application.675  Regulation 1.78, which 
implements the priority benefit statutory provisions of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 119(e) and § 120, “requires that an application contain a specific 
reference to each prior-filed application to which the application seeks 
to claim priority,” including each prior-filed application’s application 
number and familial relationship.676  Further, the specific reference 
“must be included in an application data sheet . . . or the specification 
must contain . . . such reference in the first sentence(s) following the 
title.”677  The challenged patent in this case claimed priority benefit to 
its immediate parent patent (“the ‘838 patent”) and to a provisional 
application (“the ‘917 patent”) which was not co-pending at the time 
the challenged patent was filed.678  The ‘838 patent was a continuation 
of another patent (“the ‘745 patent”) that properly claimed priority 
benefit to the ‘917 provisional application.679  The challenged patent 
incorporated the ‘838 patent by reference but did not include an 
explicit recitation of the benefit claim from the ‘838 patent to the ‘745 
patent.  The issue on appeal was whether the challenged patent is 
entitled to claim benefit of the ‘917 provisional by virtue of the 
incorporation by reference of the ‘838 patent.680  The Federal Circuit 
determined that the statutory “specific reference” requirement does 
not contemplate incorporation by reference because “[t]o require the 
public to search for an unstated priority claim through incorporated 
materials would create uncertainty and would require the type of guess-
work that the statute is meant to avoid.”681 
Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.682 addressed priority benefit in 
the context of written description support.683  The challenged patent 
claimed priority to a patent cooperation treaty (PCT) application (the 
                                               
 674. 887 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 675. Id. at 1322. 
 676. Id. at 1315. 
 677. Id. at 1316 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(3) (2009)). 
 678. Id. 
 679. Id. 
 680. Id. 
 681. Id. at 1320. 
 682. 884 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 683. Id. at 1358. 
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“Emanuel PCT”), which was nearly identical to the specification of the 
challenged patent.684  During the inter partes reexamination, the 
examiner found that the challenged patent could not claim priority to 
the Emanuel PCT because the disclosure in the Emanuel PCT of only 
a “fibre optics bundle” did not provide adequate written description 
support for the broad genus of “light guides.”685  The examiner then 
rejected the claims as obvious over the Emanuel PCT in combination 
with a secondary reference.686  The PTAB reversed the examiner’s 
rejection and found that the Emanuel PCT provided written 
description support for the claimed “light guide.”687  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s finding and held that substantial evidence 
supported the PTAB’s finding.688  The parties did not dispute that a 
“fibre optics bundle” is a type of light guide and that various types of 
light guides were well-known in the art.689  Therefore, from the 
intrinsic evidence, a PHOSITA, reviewing the Emanuel PCT, would 
have understood the inventor had possession of the claimed light 
guide.690  The court also found that “prior patents reflecting the state 
of the art at the time of the invention and expert testimony regarding 
that evidence support the PTAB’s findings.”691 
Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Iancu692 addressed priority 
claims in a patent family.693  The challenged patent was the eighth 
applications in a family of applications directed to increasing athletes’ 
endurance.694  While the fourth application was pending, the patent 
owner filed a provisional application.695  The fifth application in the 
family was amended after filing to claim priority only to the provisional 
application.696  The sixth through eighth applications issued claimed 
priority benefit of the fifth through first applications and the 
provisional application.697  The patent owner did not dispute that it 
                                               
 684. Id. at 1360. 
 685. Id. at 1358, 1360. 
 686. Id. at 1360. 
 687. Id. at 1360–61. 
 688. Id. at 1364. 
 689. Id. at 1362. 
 690. Id. at 1363. 
 691. Id. 
 692. 904 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 693. Id. at 1377. 
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waived priority to the fourth through first applications in the fifth 
application but argued that the sixth application maintained priority 
back to the first application.698  On appeal, the PTAB determined that 
when the eighth application was filed, the fifth application was not 
entitled to benefit of the fourth application through first applications 
and affirmed the examiner’s rejection based on the patent that issued 
from the first application.699 
The Federal Circuit rejected patent owner’s argument that priority 
properly vested by virtue of meeting all the requirements of § 120.700  
Noting that the patent owner’s vesting argument conflates properly 
claiming priority and demonstrating entitlement to priority, the Federal 
Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in its priority determination 
because the fifth application lacked priority to the first application, and 
the eighth application’s priority claim to the first application (via the 
fifth application) did not satisfy all of § 120’s requirements.701 
3. Printed matter doctrine 
Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Ltd.702 
expanded the scope of the printed matter doctrine beyond printed 
matter to include mental steps.703  The challenged claims in Praxair 
“generally require supplying a medical provider with a cylinder of 
nitric oxide gas and providing the medical provider with certain 
prescribing information relating to the harmful side effects of nitric 
oxide for certain patients identified” with left ventricular 
dysfunction.704  During claim construction for claims 1–8 and 10, the 
PTAB interpreted the provided information, evaluating, and 
recommending “claim limitations to be either printed matter or purely 
mental steps not entitled to patentable weight” because the “limitations 
lacked a functional relationship to the other claim limitations.”705  
However, for claim 9, the PTAB interpreted the “in accordance with” 
language to mean “based on, or as a result of” and thereby established a 
functional relationship to the remaining limitations of the claim.706 
                                               
 698. Id. 
 699. Id. 
 700. Id. at 1379. 
 701. Id. at 1381. 
 702. 890 F.3d 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 703. Id. at 1031, 1038. 
 704. Id. at 1028. 
 705. Id. at 1030. 
 706. Id. 
1336 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1263 
 
Patentee, Mallinckrodt, challenged the application of the printed 
matter doctrine to claims 1–8 and 10–11.707  The Federal Circuit 
applied a two-step framework for printed matter analysis.  First, a 
determination must be made whether the claim limitation is directed 
to printed matter.708  A claim limitation is directed to printed matter if 
it claims the content of information.709  Mallinckrodt argued that the 
PTAB erred by concluding that claim limitations reciting metal steps 
were not entitled to patentable weight.710  The Federal Circuit rejected 
this argument finding that “[b]ecause claim limitations directed to 
mental steps may attempt to capture informational content, they may 
be considered printed matter lacking patentable weight in an 
obviousness analysis.”711  Here, the court found that the claims were 
directed to printed matter.712  “If a claim limitation is directed to 
printed matter, then the next step is to ascertain whether the printed 
matter is functionally related to its ‘substrate.’”713  In this case, the 
Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in finding that the 
recitation of “providing pharmaceutically acceptable nitric oxide gas” 
in the preamble did not create a functional relationship between the 
printed matter and the remaining claim limitations.714 
Judge Newman wrote separately concurring in the judgment but 
disagreeing “with the court’s view of the ‘printed matter doctrine’ and 
its application to ‘information’ and ‘mental steps.’”715  Judge Newman 
argued that unprinted matter or a mental step “does not become 
‘printed’ if it carries information, nor even if it requires thinking.”716  
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority’s analysis, which first 
applied the “printed matter doctrine” to remove some limitations from 
the claim, then reviewed what is left of the claim.717 
                                               
 707. Id. at 1031. 
 708. See id. at 1032–33. 
 709. Id. at 1031–32 (citing In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 710. Id. at 1033. 
 711. Id. 
 712. Id. at 1033–34. 
 713. Id. at 1032. 
 714. Id. at 1034. 
 715. Id. at 1038 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 716. Id. at 1039. 
 717. Id. at 1042. 
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4. Swearing behind a reference 
In Apator Miitors ApS v. Kamstrup A/S,718 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the requirements for swearing behind a reference in a post-
grant proceeding.  The court noted that an inventor can “swear behind 
a reference by proving he conceived his invention” prior to the 
reference’s effective filing date in and, after that date, diligently 
reduced his invention to practice.719  When a party seeks to prove 
conception through an inventor’s testimony, the party must proffer 
evidence, “in addition to [the inventor’s] own statements and 
documents,” corroborating the inventor’s testimony.720  “Conception 
is a question of law predicated on subsidiary factual findings, one of 
which is the sufficiency of corroboration.”721 
In this case, patentee filed a declaration from the inventor, Mr. 
Drachmann, in which he declared he conceived of the invention prior 
to the applied reference’s filing date.722  The patentee further filed e-
mails and drawings as independent evidence to corroborate the 
inventor’s testimony.723  The PTAB rejected the patentee’s attempt to 
swear behind the applied reference and found the challenged claims 
unpatentable at final written decision.724  The Federal Circuit affirmed, 
finding that substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s finding that 
Apator had not established conception prior to the effective filing date 
of the applied reference.725  The Federal Circuit noted that the 
evidence proffered by patentee “is stuck in a catch-22 of 
corroboration” because the e-mails and drawings can only provide the 
necessary corroboration with testimony from Mr. Drachman.726  The 
court found that Mr. Dachmann’s unwitnessed emails and drawing 
were insufficient on their own to corroborate his testimony.727 
                                               
 718. 887 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 719. Id. at 1295 (citing Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 
F.3d 1004, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 720. Id. (citing Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) 
(acknowledging that by requiring corroboration of the testimony, inventors cannot 
describe their actions in a self-serving manner). 
 721. Id. 
 722. Id. at 1294. 
 723. Id. 
 724. Id. at 1295. 
 725. Id. at 1296. 
 726. Id. 
 727. Id. at 1297 (noting the similarity to other circumstances were the court found 
that unwitnessed laboratory notebooks were insufficient to corroborate testimony). 
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D.   Inventorship 
In re VerHoef728 involved an appeal of the PTAB affirmance of the 
examiner’s rejection of all application claims as unpatentable under 35 
U.S.C. § 102(f), which provides that one cannot obtain a valid patent if 
“he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”729  
Conception and inventorship are questions of law that the Federal Circuit 
reviews de novo, premised on underlying factual findings that the Federal 
Circuit reviews for substantial evidence.730  The application at issue was 
directed to a dog mobility device.731  The applicant, VerHoef, conceded 
that the essential feature of the claims was conceived and suggested by a 
veterinarian.732  The Federal Circuit rejected VerHoef’s argument that he 
should be declared sole inventor because he maintained “‘intellectual 
domination’ and control” of the work.733  The Federal Circuit agreed with 
the PTO that the veterinarian was a joint inventor because she 
contributed an essential feature of the claimed invention.734 
E.   Patent Term Adjustment 
Actelion Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Matal735 addressed patent term 
adjustments under 35 U.S.C. § 154, which accounts for any undue 
delays in patent examination caused by the PTO.736  One such delay is 
an “A delay,” which arises when the PTO fails to meet statutory 
deadlines for events that occur during prosecution, such as providing 
notice to the applicant of the rejection of a claim or taking action on 
an applicant’s reply to such a rejection.737  The dispute in the appeal 
was the PTO’s “A delay” calculation.738 
Actelion filed a first PCT application on July 16, 2009 and a second 
PCT application on July 15, 2010, claiming priority to the first PCT.739  
On January 12, 2012, four days before the thirty month priority date 
(January 16, 2012), Actelion filed an application (the ‘619 
                                               
 728. 888 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 729. Id. at 1363, 1365. 
 730. Id. at 1365. 
 731. Id. at 1364. 
 732. See id. at 1364–65. 
 733. Id. at 1366. 
 734. Id. 
 735. 881 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 736. Id. at 1340. 
 737. Id. at 1340–41. 
 738. Id. at 1340. 
 739. Id. at 1342. 
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application). This was a national stage application of the second PCT 
application, claiming priority from the July 16, 2009 priority date.740  
With the application filing, Actelion filed a preliminary amendment 
stating that “[a]pplicant earnestly solicits early examination” but did 
not check the box on Form 1390 indicating “an express request to 
begin national examination procedures.”741  On April 26, 2013, the 
PTO issued a restriction requirement which undisputedly ended the 
accrual of “A delay.”742  The PTO later issued an issue notification 
providing a grant of forty-one patent term adjustment days.743  Actelion 
filed a request for recalculation and in response the PTO reduced the 
PTA to forty days.744  Actelion then filed suit against the PTO in the 
Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to § 154(b)(4).745 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the PTO.746  The Federal Circuit found that Actelion’s 
remark that it “earnestly solicits early examination and allowance of 
these claims” was insufficient to communicate to the PTO an “express 
request” pursuant to § 371(f) under either the pre- or post-Technical 
Corrections Act747 statute.748  The Federal Circuit also found no error 
with the PTO’s determination that because January 16, 2012 was a 
national holiday, the national stage for the ‘675 patent commenced on 
January 17, 2012, the next workday.749 
F.   Federal Circuit Procedures 
The Federal Circuit dismissed a cross-appeal in Droplets, Inc. v. 
E*TRADE Bank as improper.750  Both Droplets and E*TRADE argued 
                                               
 740. Id. 
 741. Id. 
 742. Id. 
 743. Id. 
 744. Id. 
 745. Id. at 1342–43. 
 746. Id. at 1346. 
 747. On January 14, 2013, Congress enacted the Technical Corrections-Leahy 
Smith America Invents Act (“Technical Corrections Act”).  Pub. L. No. 112-274, 126 
Stat. 2456 (2013).  The Technical Corrections Act included amendments to provisions 
of 35 U.S.C. § 154, covering patent term adjustments.  Prior to the amendments under 
TCA, § 154(b)(1)(A)(i)(II) read “the date on which an international application 
fulfilled the requirements of section 371 of this title” and after amendments read “the 
date of commencement of the national stage under section 371 in an international 
application.”  See 126 Stat. at 2457. 
 748. Actelion Pharm., 881 F.3d at 1345–46. 
 749. Id. at 1346. 
 750. 887 F.3d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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that 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) language that a party who is dissatisfied with 
the final written decision of the PTAB may appeal permits a party to 
appeal not only the outcome but alternative invalidity grounds.751  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed, stressing that it is a well-established rule that 
as an appellate tribunal, the Federal Circuit reviews judgments, not 
opinions.752  Further, a cross-appeal is only proper when acceptance of 
the argument advanced “would result in a reversal or modification of 
the judgment rather than an affirmance.”753  In this case, because the 
PTAB “entered a judgment of invalidity as to all challenged claims, there 
is no basis for a cross-appeal as to additional grounds for invalidity.”754 
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp.755 involved the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.756  The appeal arises solely from a 
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.757 
monopolization claim under the Sherman758 and Clayton759 Acts 
alleging fraud on the PTO.760  The Federal Circuit declined to exercise 
jurisdiction and transferred the case to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.761  Because Federal Circuit jurisdiction 
extends to cases in which patent law is a necessary element of one of 
the well-pleaded claims, the only question for the appeal was “whether 
the monopolization allegation ‘necessarily depends on resolution of a 
substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a 
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.’”762  The Federal 
Circuit found that in this case there was nothing unique to patent law 
about the allegations of false statements made to the PTO.763 
                                               
 751. Id. at 1321. 
 752. Id. 
 753. Id. at 1322 (quoting TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 
1151, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 754. Id. 
 755. 882 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 756. Id. 
 757. 382 U.S. 172, 176–77 (1965) (holding that enforcement of a patent procured 
by fraud could be a federal antitrust violation). 
 758. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38). 
 759. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53). 
 760. Xitronix Corp., 882 F.3d at 1076. 
 761. Id. at 1075–76. 
 762. Id. at 1076–77. 
 763. Id. at 1077. 
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In In re Power Integrations, Inc.,764 the Federal Circuit denied the 
petitions for a writ of mandamus filed by the petitioner in four denied 
IPRs.765  In each proceeding, the PTAB found that none of the applied 
references were shown to be prior art and therefore denied 
institution.766  Petitioner requested rehearing and the PTAB denied the 
request for rehearing, filing a detailed opinion explaining its decision.767  
Section 314(d) of Title 35 entitled “No Appeal,” specifies that “[t]he 
determination by the Director whether to institute an IPR under this 
section shall be final and nonappealable.”768  Faced with this statutory 
prohibition on appeal, the petitioner did not directly appeal but sought 
to obtain review of the non-institution decision through petitions for 
mandamus covering all four of the PTAB’s orders.769  To gain the 
remedy of mandamus, the petitioner must show that its right for a writ 
of mandamus is “clear and indisputable,” and that there are no 
“adequate alternative legal channels” for relief.770  The Federal Circuit 
held that mandamus does not lie in this case because the present case 
involves no issues extraneous to the application of patent law principles 
of unpatentability based on printed publications, nor does it involve any 
“shenanigans” on the part of the PTAB that might justify appellate 
review or review by mandamus.771  The court however noted that the 
decision “is not to say that mandamus will never lie in response to action 
by the agency relating to the non-institution of inter partes review.”772 
In Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC,773 the Federal 
Circuit refused to consider patent owner’s argument, framed as an 
alternative basis for affirmance of the PTAB’s decision because patent 
owner did not file a cross-appeal.774  In this case, patent owner, f’real, 
filed and served a complaint alleging infringement of the challenged 
patent in October 2014.775  However, at the time, the patents were 
assigned to a holding company (Rich Products Corporation) and not 
to f’real; therefore, f’real moved to voluntarily dismiss the complaint 
                                               
 764. 899 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 765. Id. at 1316–17. 
 766. Id. at 1318. 
 767. Id. 
 768. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012)). 
 769. Id. at 1319. 
 770. Id. 
 771. Id. at 1321. 
 772. Id. 
 773. 908 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 774. Id. at 1337. 
 775. Id. at 1336. 
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without prejudice.776  In January 2016, f’real, joined with Rich 
Products, filed a new complaint asserting infringement of the 
challenged patent.777  In May 2016, more than one year after the service 
of the first complaint, petitioner filed an IPR petition challenging the 
asserted claims.778  The PTAB determined that the petition was not 
subject to the one-year bar of § 315(b) because f’real lacked standing 
to file the original complaint and therefore the complaint was not a 
“proper federal pleading.”779  In view of the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Click-to-Call, f’real argued that the one-year time-bar of § 315(b) 
applies, and the PTAB lacked jurisdiction to institute and asked the 
Federal Circuit to dismiss the IPR petition.780  The Federal Circuit 
refused.781  Although framed as an alternative basis to affirm the 
PTAB’s decision, the Federal Circuit determined that f’real’s 
argument, if it had merit, would require vacatur of the PTAB’s decision 
and a remand for dismissal of the petition.782  Because acceptance of 
the argument would require a modification of the PTAB’s decision, a 
cross-appeal was required and because f’real did not file a cross-appeal, 
the Federal Circuit did not reach the § 315(b) issue.783 
G.   Attorneys’ Fees and Sanctions 
In Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.,784 the Federal 
Circuit considered the PTAB’s power to issue sanctions and to accept 
late filings.785  Late in the IPR trial, but before the final written decision 
was issued, Atlanta Gas’s parent company, AGL Resources Inc., merged 
with another company and changed its name.786  Atlanta Gas did not 
notify the PTAB of the merger or the name change, and the PTAB did 
not know of the changes when it issued its final decision.787  Shortly 
after issuance of the final written decision, the patent owner notified 
the PTAB of petitioner’s changed corporate parentage and sought 
                                               
 776. Id. 
 777. Id. at 1336–37. 
 778. Id. at 1337. 
 779. Id. 
 780. Id. 
 781. Id. 
 782. Id. 
 783. Id. 
 784. 905 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 785. Id. at 1316. 
 786. Id. at 1313–14. 
 787. Id. at 1314. 
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sanctions for petitioner’s nondisclosure.788  Because the merger 
created a conflict, one member of the panel recused himself and the 
reconstituted panel authorized patent owner to move for the “costs 
and fees” it had incurred between the date of the final written decision 
and the PTAB’s grant of sanctions.789  At the time of the Federal Circuit 
decision, the PTAB had not ruled on the sanction motion.790  Because 
the PTAB has not quantified any sanctions, pendent jurisdiction would 
be required to decide the challenges to the PTAB’s sanction order.791  
The Federal Circuit extends pendent jurisdiction only reluctantly and 
only to issues “inextricably intertwined” with or necessary to resolution 
of issues already before the court.792  The court declined to exercise 
pendent jurisdiction in this case and remanded the issue to the PTAB 
to consider its order given the outcome of the appeal.793 
Section 145 actions in which the applicant files a civil action against 
the Director of the PTO in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia are rare.794  However, in 2018, the Federal 
Circuit addressed the issue of whether applicants who invoke § 145 are 
required to pay PTO’s attorneys’ fees.795  The Federal Circuit split on 
the issue with a strong dissent by Chief Judge Prost combined with the 
Fourth Circuit’s position in Shammas v. Focarino,796 Shammas involved 
15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3), a trademark analogue to § 145, and with its 
split from the majority in Nantkwest, creates the possibility that this 
issue could ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court.797 
                                               
 788. Id. 
 789. Id. 
 790. Id. 
 791. Id. at 1315. 
 792. Id. 
 793. Id. at 1316. 
 794. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012); see also Jeremiah Frueauf et al., Biopharma Patent 
Applicants Should Consider a Rarely Used Strategy, STERNE KESSLER (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:01 
AM), https://www.sternekessler.com/news-insights/publications/biopharma-patent-
applicants-should-consider-rarely-used-strategy. 
 795. See Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(discussing whether § 145 would allow PTO to collect attorneys’ fees). 
 796. 784 F.3d 219 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 797. Compare Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180 (holding that § 145 does not require the 
applicant to pay attorneys’ fees), with id. at 1196 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that 
§ 145 requires the applicant to pay all expenses relating to the proceedings, including 
the PTO personal expenses), and Shammas, 784 F.3d at 227 (awarding attorneys’ fees 
to the PTO under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3)). 
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In Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu,798 the en banc court addressed the issue of 
whether applicants who invoke § 145 are required by statute to pay “[a]ll 
the expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the office in defending 
the PTAB’s decision, including the PTO’s attorneys’ fees.799  The 
majority of the court determined that it did not because the American 
Rule800 prohibits courts from shifting attorneys’ fees from one party to 
another absent a “specific and explicit” directive from Congress.801 
The Patent Act802 provides two mutually exclusive options for judicial 
review of an adverse PTAB decision.803  The applicant may appeal 
directly to the Federal Circuit under § 141, or the applicant may file a 
civil action against the director of the PTO in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under § 145.804  A § 145 
challenge is more expansive involving the possibility of discovery, new 
evidence, motions practice, and a trial.805  An applicant proceeding 
under § 145 is responsible for his own expenses and fees but also the 
PTO’s “expenses of the proceeding.”806  The majority noted that 
previously the PTO relied on the “expenses” provision to recover travel 
expenses to attend depositions, court reporter fees, and reasonable 
fees for expert witnesses but “[f]or more than 170 years, however, the 
PTO never sought—and no court ever awarded—attorneys’ fees under 
§ 145 or its predecessor.”807 
The majority first determined that the American Rule, providing 
that “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose,” applies 
to § 145.808  The American Rule serves as the “basic point of reference” 
whenever a court “consider[s] the award of attorney’s fees” and may 
only be displaced by an express grant from Congress.809  The majority 
                                               
 798. 898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 799. Id. at 1180. 
 800. See id. at 1181 (explaining that the American Rule dates back to at least the 
jurisprudence of the late 1700s and states that litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees, 
regardless of whether they win or lose). 
 801. Id. at 1180. 
 802. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 803. See Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180 (outlining the Patent Act’s procedures for 
judicial review). 
 804. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2012); Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180. 
 805. Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1180. 
 806. Id. 
 807. Id. at 1180–81. 
 808. Id. at 1181, 1184 (quoting Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 
2164 (2015)). 
 809. Id. at 1181 (citing Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct at 2164). 
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then found that § 145’s statement that “[a]ll the expenses of the 
proceedings shall be paid by the applicant” lacks the “specific and 
explicit” congressional authorization required to displace the 
American Rule.810  The majority reviewed Congress’s usage of the terms 
“expenses” and “attorneys’ fees” in other statutes and judicial usage of 
statute and concluded that these demonstrated that the ordinary 
meaning of “expenses” does not include attorneys’ fees.811 
Chief Judge Prost, joined by Judges Dyk, Reyna, and Hughes, 
dissented.812  The dissent argued the plain text of § 145 provides the 
answer—when it says “[a]ll the expenses of proceeding shall be paid 
by the applicant” it means the applicant must pay all the expenses of 
the proceeding.813  The dissent noted that the PTO used salaried 
government lawyers to assist in defending and therefore these lawyers 
incurred expenses because the time they devoted to this case was not 
available for other work.814  The dissent concluded that the language 
of § 145 evinces Congress’s “specific and explicit” intent to depart from 
the American Rule and to impose upon the applicant payment of all the 
expenses of the proceeding, including the PTO’s personnel expenses.815 
VI.    REMEDIES 
Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit took on the issue 
of damages in patent infringement cases.  In one of the most 
significant cases of the year, the Supreme Court ruled in WesternGeco 
LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.816 that a patent owner can collect lost 
profits based on foreign sales. The Federal Circuit’s damages cases 
primarily address the issue of apportionment of damages which is a 
central component of every patent damages case. 
In FastShip, LLC v. United States,817 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
Court of Federal Claims’s determination of infringement but modified 
the damages award.818  FastShip, LLC sued the United States in the 
Court of Federal Claims alleging infringement by two of the Navy’s 
                                               
 810. Id. at 1187. 
 811. Id. at 1187–91. 
 812. Id. at 1196 (Prost, C.J., dissenting). 
 813. Id. 
 814. Id. at 1197. 
 815. Id. at 1203. 
 816. 138 S. Ct. 2120 (2018). 
 817. 892 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 818. Id. at 1300–01. 
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Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).819  After finding 
infringement of the asserted claims, the Court of Federal Claims 
determined that one of the accused ships was not “manufactured” for 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.820  The case turned on the meaning of 
“manufactured” in § 1498, which was a matter of first impression.821  
The Federal Circuit interpreted “manufactured” in accordance with its 
plain meaning, such that a product is “manufactured” when it is made 
to include each limitation of the thing invented and is therefore 
suitable for use.822  Applying this interpretation, the Federal Circuit 
found that the ship was not manufactured prior to the expiration of 
the patent.823  The court further agreed with both parties that the 
Court of Federal Claims miscalculated the total royalty base and 
modified the damages award accordingly.824 
A.   Apportionment 
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.825 dealt with apportionment of 
damages.826  When the accused technology does not make up the whole 
of the accused product, the patentee must separate or apportion the 
infringer’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented 
feature and the unpatented features.827  The patentee’s apportionment 
evidence “must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or 
speculative.”828  Finjan apportioned its damages base to a specific feature 
that was the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit” of the infringing 
product.829  However, because the feature also contained non-infringing 
features, the Federal Circuit found that additional apportionment was 
                                               
 819. Id. at 1300. 
 820. Id. at 1302–03.  Section 1498(a) provides that “[w]henever an invention 
described in and covered by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by 
or for the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or 
manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States 
in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and 
entire compensation for such use and manufacture.”  28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012). 
 821. Fastship, 892 F.3d at 1303. 
 822. Id. at 1306. 
 823. Id. 
 824. Id. at 1310. 
 825. 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 826. Id. at 1302. 
 827. Id. at 1310. 
 828. Id. (quoting Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)). 
 829. Id. 
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still required.830  The Federal Circuit also found that Finjan’s royalty rate 
was unsupported by substantial evidence.831  Despite finding that “Finjan 
failed to present a damages case that can support the jury’s verdict,” the 
Federal Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether 
Finjan waived the right to establish a reasonable royalty under a new 
theory and whether to order a new trial on damages.832 
In Exmark Manufacturing Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, 
LLC,833 the Federal Circuit vacated the jury’s damages award and 
remanded for a new trial on damages.834  Briggs & Stratton Power 
Products Group argued that the damages expert should have 
apportioned or separated the value of the improvement from the other 
features of the mower through the royalty base rather than the royalty 
rate.835  The Federal Circuit disagreed noting that apportionment can 
be addressed in a variety of ways, including “by careful selection of the 
royalty base to reflect the value added by the patented feature [or] . . . 
by adjustment of the royalty rate so as to discount the value of a product’s 
non-patented features; or by a combination thereof.”836  Here, using the 
accused mower sales as a royalty base, an apportioning through the 
royalty rate is an acceptable methodology provided that patent owner 
adequately and reliably apportions between the improved and 
conventional features of the accused mower.837  The Federal Circuit 
found that the expert opinion of the patent owner’s damages expert was 
inadmissible because it failed to adequately tie the expert’s proposed 
royalty rate to the facts of the case and concluded that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying patent owner’s motion for a new trial 
on damages.838  The Federal Circuit further determined that “the district 
court abused its discretion by holding that prior art is relevant to 
damages only to the extent that the prior art was commercialized.”839 
In Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc.,840 
the Federal Circuit addressed the entire market value rule.841  In this 
                                               
 830. Id. 
 831. Id. at 1311–12. 
 832. Id. at 1312. 
 833. 879 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 834. Id. at 1347. 
 835. Id. at 1348. 
 836. Id. (citing Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 837. Id. 
 838. Id. at 1349. 
 839. Id. at 1352. 
 840. 894 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 841. Id. at 1262. 
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case, the damages verdict rested on Power Integrations’ reliance on the 
entire market value rule, which “allows for the recovery of damages 
based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several features, 
when the feature patented constitutes the basis for consumer 
demand.”842  “If the product has other valuable features that also 
contribute to driving consumer—demand, patented or unpatented— 
then the damages for patent infringement must be apportioned to 
reflect only the value of the patented feature.”843  The Federal Circuit 
found that the evidence presented by Power Integrations was insufficient 
as a matter of law to invoke the entire market value rule, vacated the jury 
award of $139.8 million in damages, and remanded for a new trial.844 
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s determination of the 
ongoing royalty rate in XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.845  After a 
jury found defendant willfully infringed the asserted patents and that 
the asserted patents were not invalid, patent owner filed a motion 
seeking an award of an ongoing royalty as an equitable remedy for 
defendant’s future infringement.846  Noting that defendant admitted 
that it intended to continue to practice the asserted patents, the district 
court determined an ongoing royalty would be appropriate.847  The 
district court observed that the jury effectively adopted the fifteen 
royalty rate on gross sales and the four percent royalty rate for reverse 
sorting services proposed by patent owner’s damages expert at trial, 
and “every one of XY’s prior licenses include[d] a [ten percent] royalty 
rate, which tend[ed] to prove that [ten percent] [was] XY’s established 
royalty.”848  Based on these observations, the district court calculated 
an ongoing royalty rate for gross sales by averaging the jury’s 15% 
percent rate with the 10% rate in the prior licenses to arrive at 12.5% 
and calculated for services by taking half of the 4% royalty rate.849  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court, which focused on pre-
verdict factors “that were either irrelevant or less relevant than post-
verdict factors” such as prior agreements between the parties.850  The 
                                               
 842. Id. at 1270 (quoting Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 843. Id. at 1271. 
 844. Id. at 1273. 
 845. 890 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 846. Id. at 1288–89. 
 847. Id. at 1289. 
 848. Id. 
 849. Id. 
 850. Id. at 1297. 
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court found that the district court’s focus should have been on patent 
owner’s improved bargaining position and any other changed economic 
factors rather than patent owner’s past acts.851  The Federal Circuit 
remanded for the district court to recalculate the ongoing royalty rate.852 
B.   Enhanced Damages 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a “court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed.”  In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. 
Pulse Electronics, Inc.,853 the Supreme Court described § 284 “as 
providing that ‘punitive or increased damages’ could be recovered ‘in 
a case of willful or bad-faith infringement.’”854  However, a finding of 
willful infringement does not require the district court to award 
enhanced damages.855  In Polara Engineering Inc. v. Campbell Co.,856 the 
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision to award enhanced 
damages because the district court did not adequately explain its basis 
for doing so.857  Applying the factors listed in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,858 
the district court determined that five of the nine Read factors favored 
an award of enhanced damages, two of the factors weighed against 
enhancement, and two of the factors were neutral.859  The Federal 
Circuit determined that the district court’s observation that 
“obviousness was a close call” and that the “other invalidity theories 
were weaker” was insufficient to determine why the district court 
viewed the closeness of the Read factor as neutral.860  The Federal 
Circuit remanded instructing “the district court to provide a more 
complete explanation, including a discussion of the public use 
defense, in exercising its discretion.  We express no view on whether 
damages should be enhanced or, if so, by what amount.”861 
                                               
 851. Id. at 1298. 
 852. Id. 
 853. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 854. Id. at 1930.  The Federal Circuit remanded in Exmark Manufacturing Co. v. 
Briggs & Stratton Power Products Group, LLC because the district court’s decision that 
excluded evidence did not comport with the standard articulated in Halo.  Exmark, 879 
F.3d 1332, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 855. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933. 
 856. 894 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 857. Id. at 1355–56. 
 858. 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 859. Polara, 894 F.3d at 1347. 
 860. Id. at 1355. 
 861. Id. at 1356. 
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C.   Attorneys’ Fees—Exceptional Cases 
Raniere v. Microsoft Corp.862 dealt with the contours of exceptional case 
requirements.863  Raniere sued Microsoft and AT&T for patent 
infringement and asserted five patents against AT&T and two against 
Microsoft.864  Raniere assigned all rights in the patents to Global 
Technologies, Inc. (GTI), and later Raniere executed a document on 
behalf to GTI that purportedly transferred the asserted patents from 
GTI to himself.865  Microsoft moved to dismiss the suit for lack of 
standing.866  After discovery on the issue of standing and a hearing, the 
district court concluded that Raniere was unlikely to be able to cure 
the standing defect and dismissed the case with prejudice.867  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed.868  While the merits appeal was pending, 
Microsoft and AT&T filed a motion seeking attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.869 
In exceptional cases, a district court may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.870  An exceptional case is “simply one that 
stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a 
party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the 
case was litigated.”871  The Federal Circuit rejected Raniere’s argument 
that a dismissal with prejudice, without adjudication of a patent 
infringement claim, precludes a finding that a defendant has 
prevailed.872  First, the court noted that under the Supreme Court’s 
holding in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission,873 “a defendant need not obtain a favorable judgment on 
the merits in order to be a ‘prevailing party.’”874  Other circuits have 
interpreted CRST to mean that, if a defendant prevails on a 
jurisdictional issue, it may be a prevailing party.875  Second, the court 
                                               
 862. 887 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 863. Id. at 1303. 
 864. Id. at 1300. 
 865. Id. 
 866. Id. 
 867. Id. 
 868. Id. 
 869. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 870. Id. 
 871. Raniere, 887 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct 1749, 1756 (2014)). 
 872. Id. 
 873. 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1651 (2016). 
 874. Raniere, 887 F.3d at 1304. 
 875. Id. at 1305–06, 1306 n.1 (discussing varying approaches among the circuits). 
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found that even without the benefit of CRST, defendant was a 
prevailing party because the district court dismissed Raniere’s 
infringement suit “with prejudice,” which was tantamount to a decision 
on the merits.876  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that the case was exceptional based on Raniere’s behavior 
throughout the litigation employing “a pattern of obfuscation and bad 
faith” which caused the defendants to incur significant fees and costs 
to oppose Raniere’s positions.877 
The Federal Circuit in In re Rembrandt Technologies LP Patent 
Litigation878 affirmed the district court’s exceptional case 
determination but vacated the fee award.879  The court deemed the 
case exception for three reasons: (1) Rembrandt improperly 
compensated its fact witnesses; (2) Rembrandt engaged in (or failed to 
prevent) widespread document spoliation over a number of years; and 
(3) Rembrandt should have known that the asserted patents that were 
revived after abandonment were unenforceable.880  After noting that 
the “district court’s remarkably terse orders shed little light on its 
justifications for its decisions on these fact-intensive issues,” the Federal 
Circuit could not say that any of the district court’s findings were based 
“on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment 
of the evidence.”881  Regarding the fee award, the Federal Circuit held 
that the district court failed to establish a “causal connection” between 
the misconduct and the fee award.882  The Federal Circuit vacated the 
fee award and remanded for the district court to determine how much 
of the claimed fee award Rembrandt should pay based on the 
misconduct associated with the exceptional case determination.883 
In Energy Heating, LLC. v Heat On-the-Fly, LLC,884 the Federal Circuit 
vacated the district court’s denial of motions for attorneys’ fees under 
§ 285 and remanded for further proceedings on the issue.885  After 
finding inequitable conduct, the district court declined to award fees 
stating that the patentee “reasonably disputed facts with its own 
                                               
 876. Id. at 1307. 
 877. Id. at 1308. 
 878. 899 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 879. Id. at 1260–61. 
 880. Id. at 1265. 
 881. Id. at 1266–67. 
 882. Id. at 1280. 
 883. Id. 
 884. 889 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 885. Id. at 1306. 
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evidence and provided a meritorious argument against a finding of 
inequitable conduct.”886  However, the court noted that under 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,887 inequitable conduct 
requires a specific intent to deceive, and “to meet the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, the specific intent to deceive must be 
‘the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the 
evidence.’”888  Because the district court’s reasoning contradicted 
Therasense, the Federal Circuit was unsure whether the court’s basis for 
denial rested on a misunderstanding of the law or an erroneous fact 
finding and remanded to the district court for reconsideration.889 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
accused infringer’s motion for attorney fees in Stone Basket Innovations, 
LLC v. Cook Medical LLC.890  After plaintiff filed its infringement case, 
the accused infringer filed an IPR petition challenging all claims of the 
asserted patent.891  The PTAB instituted trial, and the patent owner 
subsequently requested an adverse judgment.892  After the PTAB 
granted adverse judgment, the patent owner moved to dismiss the 
patent litigation with prejudice.893  The district court determined that 
the case was not exceptional and found that the record did not 
demonstrate that patent owner “willfully ignored the prior art or failed 
to evaluate its case” or that patent owner’s “actions were . . . objectively 
unreasonable in light of the circumstances.”894  The Federal Circuit 
rejected the accused infringers’ argument that its invalidity 
contentions placed patent owner on clear notice of the asserted 
patent’s invalidity because the contentions were based on prior art 
considered by the examiner with no further explanation.895  The 
inventor’s deposition testimony regarding the novelty of a single claim 
element also did not make the case exceptional because invalidity is 
established by considering the patent claim as a whole.896  Finally, the 
Federal Circuit found that the district court was within its discretion to 
                                               
 886. Id. at 1307. 
 887. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 888. Energy Heating, 889 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290). 
 889. Id. at 1308. 
 890. 892 F.3d 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 891. Id. at 1177. 
 892. Id. at 1177–78. 
 893. Id. at 1178. 
 894. Id. at 1178–79. 
 895. Id. at 1179–80. 
 896. Id. at 1180. 
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factor in the accused infringer’s litigation conduct because conduct of 
the parties is a relevant factor under the totality-of-the-circumstances 
inquiry in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.897  Here, the 
accused infringer failed to inform patent owner that it believed it was 
being subjected to exceptional litigation behavior or demand that the 
case be dismissed.898 
D.   Double Recovery 
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America, 
Inc.899 dealt with the issue of double recovery.900  At trial, the jury found 
the defendant liable for trade secret misappropriation and patent 
infringement.901  The Federal Circuit vacated the patent infringement 
damages, holding that the patent award represented an impermissible 
double recovery because although the jury awarded only a portion of 
the proposed patent royalty, the patent award covered sales that were 
part of the trade secret misappropriation disgorgement award.902 
E.   Injunction 
To obtain a permanent injunction, a party succeeding on the merits 
of patent infringement, must show (1) irreparable injury in the 
absence of an injunction, (2) inadequacy of compensatory remedies at 
law, (3) a balance of hardships favoring an injunction, and (4) 
consistency of an injunction with the public interest.903 
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions904 dealt with the first element 
from eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.905  The district court found that 
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions (TAOS) had not shown 
irreparable harm because TAOS requested a reasonable royalty as 
compensation for past infringement and a reasonable royalty should 
be adequate to compensate TAOS for future infringement.906  The 
court found that a request for relief in the form of a reasonable royalty 
may be relevant to the irreparable harm and inadequacy of 
                                               
 897. Stone Basket, 892 F.3d at 1181. 
 898. Id. 
 899. 895 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 900. Id. at 1328. 
 901. Id. 
 902. Id. 
 903. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 904. Tex. Adv. Optoelectronic Sols., 895 F.3d at 1331. 
 905. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 906. Tex. Adv. Optoelectronic Sols., 895 F.3d at 1331. 
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compensation elements of eBay but it does not mean there do not exist 
the kinds of hard-to-measure harms that can justify injunctions to 
prevent them before they occur.907  The Federal Circuit therefore 
vacated the district court’s denial of an injunction and remanded for 
further consideration of the request.908 
MACOM Technology Solutions Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies 
AG909 was another 2018 case involving injunctions. Nitronex 
(predecessor to MACOM) obtained several patents related to gallium 
nitride (GaN) which it later sold to Infineon’s predecessor 
(International Rectifier Corporation).910  As part of the sale, the parties 
executed a license agreement defining a “Field of Use” characterized 
by GaN-on-silicon technology and licensing MACOM to practice the 
patents within the “Field of Use only.”911  Infineon notified MACOM 
that it believe MACOM breached the agreement by making and selling 
GaN-on-silicon-carbide technology and subsequently terminated the 
agreement.912  MACOM sued Infineon asserting contract claims, a 
claim for declaratory judgment of non-infringement of the licensed 
patents, and a declaratory judgment that the agreement was wrongly 
terminated and remains in effect (wrongful termination claim).913  
MACOM also moved for a preliminary injunction based on the 
wrongful termination claim.914  The district court granted the 
preliminary injunction invalidating the termination of the agreement, 
barring Infineon from designing, developing, making, using offering 
to sell, selling or servicing products in the exclusive field that practice 
the licensed patents, and prohibiting Infineon from granting licenses 
or sublicenses to the licensed patents.915 
To obtain a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, a party must 
show that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the 
balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 
                                               
 907. Id. 
 908. Id. at 1332. 
 909. 881 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 910. Id. at 1326. 
 911. Id. 
 912. Id. at 1326–27. 
 913. Id. at 1327. 
 914. Id. 
 915. Id. 
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public interest.916  The Federal Circuit rejected Infineon’s argument 
that the district court erred in finding that MACOM showed a 
likelihood of success on its wrongful termination claim because 
Infineon’s termination of the agreement was not wrongful.917  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not err in finding 
that MACOM could likely establish that its activity outside the 
agreement’s licensed Field of Use did not breach the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.918  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Infineon’s second argument that the district court erred in finding that 
MACOM was likely to suffer irreparable harm.919  The Federal Circuit 
determined that the district court did not rely only on Infineon’s 
marketing in finding irreparable harm; it also relied on the 
commercial benefits of the agreement’s exclusivity.920  The Federal 
Circuit then concluded “that a sufficient causal nexus exists between 
Infineon’s termination of the Agreement and this harm to MACOM 
that the district court identified.”921  Infineon also challenged the 
content of the injunction.922  The Federal Circuit vacated the first 
sentence which enjoined Infineon from undertaking certain activities 
concerning products in the exclusive field because it lacked the 
specificity required by Rule 65(d).923  The court found that the 
injunction prohibited infringing acts—but without reference to any 
particular, adjudicated infringing product.924  The Federal Circuit also 
vacated the second sentence which enjoined Infineon from granting 
particular licenses or sublicenses because it ordered specific 
performance of a provision without a showing of a breach.925 
                                               
 916. Id. at 1328 (citing Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th 
Cir. 2017)). 
 917. Id. 
 918. Id. at 1329. 
 919. Id. at 1330–31. 
 920. Id. 
 921. Id. at 1331. 
 922. Id. 
 923. Id.  Rule 65(d) mandates that every order granting an injunction must “state 
the reasons why it issued,” “state its terms specifically,” and “describe in reasonable 
detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts 
restrained or required.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). 
 924. MACOM Tech. Sols., 881 F.3d at 1332. 
 925. Id. at 1332–33. 
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VII.    DISTRICT COURT 
A.   Procedural 
01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc.926 affirmed the 
district court’s denial of patentee’s, 01 Communique Lab, motion for 
a new trial.927  On appeal, Communique argued that it was “entitled to 
a new trial on the issues of infringement and damages because Citrix 
resorted to ‘a well-known defendant’s trick,’ known as the ‘practicing 
the prior art defense.’”928  The Federal Circuit agreed that there is no 
“‘practicing the prior art’ defense to literal infringement”929 but noted 
that a litigant is not precluded from arguing that if a claim term must 
be broadly interpreted to read on an accused device, then this broad 
construction will read on the prior art.930  The Federal Circuit further 
noted that “when an accused product and the prior art are closely 
aligned, it takes exceptional linguistic dexterity to simultaneously 
establish infringement and evade invalidity.”931  That was exactly the 
problem faced by Communique in this case.  The Federal Circuit found 
that the arguments by Citrix did not rest on an improper “practicing the 
prior art” defense but instead correctly recognized that claim terms must 
be construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.932  The 
court further rejected the argument that Citrix’s comparisons were 
“devastatingly prejudicial to the integrity of the trial” because the jury 
instructions made “abundantly clear” that in assessing infringement the 
jury was not to compare the accused product to the prior art.933 
In SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC,934 the Federal Circuit vacated the 
district court’s order dismissing SimpleAir’s complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) as barred by issue preclusion and the Kessler935 doctrine.936  
SimpleAir initiated a series of patent infringement lawsuits asserting one 
or more patents from a family of patents against Google over a six-year 
                                               
 926. 889 F.3d 735 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 927. Id. at 744. 
 928. Id. at 740–41. 
 929. Id. at 742. 
 930. Id. 
 931. Id. at 742–43. 
 932. Id. at 743. 
 933. Id. at 743–44. 
 934. 884 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 935. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285, 288–90 (1907) (holding that a patent holder is 
barred from bringing an infringement action against a customer of a seller who, prior 
to the sale, prevailed on an action for infringement on the same patent). 
 936. SimpleAir, 884 F.3d at 1162–63. 
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period.937  The asserted patents are children linked to the same parent 
by continuation applications, and therefore, share a common 
specification with the parent.938  During prosecution of the asserted 
patents, SimpleAir filed terminal disclaimers over the parent 
application to overcome an obviousness-type double patenting 
rejection.939  To date, the litigations have resulted in three judgments 
of non-infringement in Google’s favor.940 
In this case, SimpleAir’s fourth infringement case, the district court 
held that the present case and the previous cases involved the same 
claim or cause of action. The Court reasoned that the asserted patents 
shared the same title and specification with the previously adjudicated 
patents and that the filing of a terminal disclaimer to overcome the 
PTO’s obviousness-type double patenting rejections indicated that the 
PTO believed the content of the patents in suit to be patentably 
indistinct from the earlier patents.941  Notably, the district court never 
compared the claims of the asserted patents with the claims of the 
previously adjudicated patents.942 
The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred by presuming 
that a terminally disclaimed continuation patent presents the same 
cause of action as a parent patent based on the filing of the terminal 
disclaimer alone.943  Although a terminal disclaimer is a strong clue 
that the claims in a continuation lacked a patentable distinction over 
the parent, that strong clue does not give rise to the presumption that 
a patent subject to a terminal disclaimer is patentably indistinct from 
its parent patent.944  The court further noted that its cases “foreclose 
the inference that filing a terminal disclaimer functions as an 
admission regarding the patentability of the resulting claims.”945  The 
                                               
 937. Id. at 1163. 
 938. Id. 
 939. Id. 
 940. Id. 
 941. Id. at 1164. 
 942. Id. 
 943. Id. at 1169. 
 944. Id. at 1168. 
 945. Id. at 1167 (citing Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 
1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A terminal disclaimer is simply not an admission that a later-
filed invention is obvious.”); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 941 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (rejecting argument that patent applicant admitted to obviousness-type double 
patenting by filing terminal disclaimer); Quad Envtl. Techs. Corp. v. Union Sanitary 
Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he filing of a terminal disclaimer simply 
1358 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1263 
 
court vacated the district court’s order and remanded to the district 
court to determine whether the asserted claims are patentably distinct 
from the previously adjudicated claims.946 
B.   Pleading Standard 
In Disc Disease Solutions, Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc.947 and Nalco Co. v. 
Chem-Mod, LLC,948 the Federal Circuit addressed the pleading standard 
for patent infringement claims.949  In Disc Disease, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim.950  The plaintiff filed a complaint 
alleging patent infringement that specifically identified the accused 
products and alleged the products meet “each and every element of at 
least one claim” of the asserted patents, “either literally or 
equivalently.”951  The following day, amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure took effect, abrogating Rule 84 and Form 18.952  The 
district court subsequently granted defendants motion to dismiss the 
complaint finding that the complaint did not satisfy the Iqbal and 
Twombly953 plausibility standard.954  The Federal Circuit disagreed 
holding that plaintiff’s allegations provided the defendant fair notice 
of infringement of the asserted patents and therefore were sufficient 
under the plausibility standard of Iqbal and Twombly.955 
In Nalco, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
Nalco’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim for direct 
infringement, indirect infringement, and infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.956  Regarding direct infringement, the court 
found that defendant’s arguments “boil[ed] down to objections to 
Nalco’s proposed claim construction for ‘flue gas’” based on alleged 
admissions made during an inter partes reexamination which was a 
                                               
serves the statutory function of removing the rejection of double patenting, and raises 
neither presumption nor estoppel on the merits of the rejection.”)). 
 946. Id. at 1171. 
 947. 888 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 948. 883 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 949. Disc Disease, 888 F.3d at 1260; Nalco, 883 F.3d at 1350. 
 950. Disc Disease, 888 F.3d at 1260. 
 951. Id. at 1258. 
 952. Id. 
 953. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007). 
 954. Disc Disease, 888 F.3d at 1258–59. 
 955. Id. at 1260. 
 956. Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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dispute not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.957  
Regarding indirect infringement, the court concluded that the 
complaint alleged facts that plausibly showed that defendants 
specifically intended their customers to infringe and that defendants 
knew the customers’ action constitute infringement.958  Regarding 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the court found that 
Nalco’s claim adequately stated a claim for infringement by explicitly 
incorporating the detailed infringement contentions explaining its 
doctrine of equivalents claim.959 
C.   Motion to Amend Complaint 
In Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,960 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Aatrix’s motion for leave 
to file a second amended complaint.961 “A district court should freely 
give leave to amend a complaint ‘when justice so requires,’”962 but may 
deny a motion to amend on numerous grounds such as “undue delay, 
undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.”963  
Noting that the district court “gave no reason for its denial of Aatrix’s 
motion to amend,” the Federal Circuit found that the proposed second 
amended complaint contained allegations that, taken as true, would 
have directly affected the district court’s patent eligibility analysis.964  
Specifically, the proposed amended complaint alleged facts directed 
to inventive concepts in the claimed invention and would be useful for 
Alice/Mayo step two that requires consideration of whether the claims 
contain an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claimed 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.965 
D.   Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction 
In AbbVie Inc. v. MedImmune Ltd.,966 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of a declaratory-judgment action.967  The 
                                               
 957. Id. at 1349. 
 958. Id. at 1356. 
 959. Id. at 1354. 
 960. 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 961. Id. at 1123. 
 962. Id. at 1126 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). 
 963. Id. (quoting Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013)). 
 964. Id. 
 965. Id. at 1126–27 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014)). 
 966. 881 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 967. Id. at 1335. 
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declaratory judgment action concerned a 1995 development and licensing 
agreement entered into by predecessors to AbbVie and MedImmune, 
licensing AbbVie to practice the challenged patent and requiring AbbVie 
to pay royalties on sales of certain antibodies “until the last to expire of 
[certain] Patents or the expiry of fifteen years from the date of first 
commercial sale of a product by [AbbVie’s predecessor) . . . (whichever is 
later).”968  AbbVie brought the declaratory-judgment action seeking only a 
declaration that the challenged claim is invalid.969  AbbVie contended that 
a declaration of the patent’s invalidity would constitute its expiration for 
purposes of the 1995 agreement and cause its royalty obligations to expire 
in January 2018.970  The district court dismissed the complaint on two 
alternative grounds:  first, because AbbVie does not practice the challenged 
patent, it is in not at risk of an infringement suit, and second, deciding the 
invalidity question would not resolve the parties’ ultimate dispute.971 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s first ground 
for dismissal holding that a contractual dispute, if properly presented, 
could be the subject of a declaratory judgment action regardless of 
whether a party was at risk of an infringement suit.972  However, AbbVie 
did not seek a declaration of its contractual obligations, only a 
declaration of invalidity that would not resolve the parties’ contractual 
dispute.973  The agreement between the parties was governed by British 
law and it is an open question whether the British courts would 
consider the invalidation of a patent to be tantamount to its expiration 
for purposes of the agreement.974  Without resolution to this question, 
the contractual dispute would persist.975  Because “a litigant may not 
use a declaratory judgment action to obtain piecemeal adjudication of 
defenses that would not finally and conclusively resolve the underlying 
controversy,” the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s second 
ground for dismissal.976 
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AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.977 also dealt 
with a declaratory judgment action.978  AIDS Healthcare Foundation 
provides medical care to persons afflicted with AIDS, including 
providing antiviral drugs such as the tenofovir alafenamide fumarate 
(“TAF”) products that Healthcare buys from defendants.979  
Healthcare sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity of five patents 
“to clear out the invalid patents” so it “would have the ability then to 
partner with generic makers and purchase TAF as soon as it could 
become available on expiration of the five-year New Chemical 
exclusivity set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).”980 Notably, no 
potential generic producer had filed an ANDA for any TAF-containing 
products at the initiation of this action, for TAF’s new chemical entity 
period of exclusivity foreclosed such a filing until November 2019.981  
The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of a 
case or controversy in terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act.982  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed. 
A plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment bears the burden of 
demonstrating that a case or actual controversy existed at the time the 
declaratory action was filed.983  That requires a showing of injury-in-
fact, connection between the challenged conduct and the injury, and 
redressability by the requested remedy.984  “The foundation of a 
declaratory action is that the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, 
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant 
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”985  Here, the Federal Circuit 
found that plaintiff had not met the immediacy and reality 
requirement because there was no present infringement, no threat of 
or possibility of infringement litigation, and no meaningful 
preparation to infringe.986  The court also rejected Healthcare’s 
argument that its actions created liability for inducing infringement 
                                               
 977. 890 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 978. Id. at 989. 
 979. Id. 
 980. Id. 
 981. Id. at 992. 
 982. Id. at 990. 
 983. Id. 
 984. Id. at 990–91 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998)). 
 985. Id. at 991 (quoting MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 
(2007); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). 
 986. Id. 
1362 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1263 
 
because there was no direct infringement.987  The Federal Circuit also 
found that an adverse economic interest is not itself an adverse legal 
interest, and the absence of a covenant not to sue infringers did not 
create a justiciable case or controversy.988  Regarding Healthcare’s 
argument that public policy is served by invalidation of invalid patents, 
the Federal Circuit noted that “the Hatch-Waxman Act is already a 
balance of several policy interests, seeking to preserve the patent 
incentive to invent new drugs, while enabling validity challenge by 
ANDA filers before actual infringement occurs.”989 
E.   Personal Jurisdiction and Venue 
The Federal Circuit addressed three petitions for writ of mandamus 
on the issue of venue under the patent venue statue.990  In re HTC 
Corp.991 addressed where foreign companies can be sued for patent 
infringement.992  HTC Corp. petitioned for writ of mandamus 
directing the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware to vacate 
its order denying-in-part HTC’s motion to dismiss for improper venue 
and dismiss the complaint.993  HTC Corp. is a Taiwanese corporation 
with its principal place of business in Taiwan, and its wholly owned U.S. 
based subsidiary, HTC America, is a Washington corporation with its 
principal place of business in Seattle, Washington.994  The Delaware 
district court found that venue was not proper as to HTC America but 
was proper as to HTC Corp.995  Following the order, plaintiffs 
voluntarily dismissed their suit against HTC America without 
prejudice.996  HTC Corp. filed a mandamus petition seeking dismissal 
for improper venue.997 
“A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in 
extraordinary circumstances.”998  “The following conditions must be 
met for the court to issue a writ: (1) the petitioner must have no other 
                                               
 987. Id. at 992–93. 
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 990. 28 U.S.C. § 1400. 
 991. 889 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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adequate means to attain the relief desired; (2) the petitioner must 
demonstrate a “clear and indisputable” right to the issuance of the writ; 
and (3) “even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing 
court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is 
appropriate under the circumstances.”‘999  The Federal Circuit found 
that the first condition was not met because “unlike a defendant 
challenging the denial of a § 1404(a) transfer motion, a defendant 
aggrieved by the denial of an improper venue motion has an adequate 
remedy on appeal from a final judgment.”1000  Specifically, if after 
judgment venue is determined to have been improper, and the improper 
venue objection was not waived, HTC Corp. “will be entitled to assert it 
on appeal and, if the objection is sustained, obtain from [the appeals] 
court an order vacating the judgment . . . and directing the remand of the 
action to the [appropriate venue].”1001  The court explained that “[g]iven 
the availability of adequate relief on appeal, mandamus review of 
improper venue decisions is generally inappropriate.”1002 
The Federal Circuit also held that HTC Corp. failed to demonstrate 
the second condition:  that its right to a writ was clear and 
indisputable.1003  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brunette 
Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.,1004 the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed the “long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly 
outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and 
special.”1005  The court explained its belief that Congress did not intend 
the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)1006 to “upend the 
centuries-old understanding that the venue laws (as opposed to 
requirements of personal jurisdiction) do not restrict the location of 
suits against alien defendants.”1007  The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011 made only one minor change to the 
alien-venue rule, limited to venue protection to alien natural persons 
                                               
 999. Id. (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004)). 
 1000. Id. at 1352–53. 
 1001. Id. at 1353 (quoting Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Leahy, 193 F.2d 302, 304–05 
(3d Cir. 1951)). 
 1002. Id. 
 1003. Id. at 1354. 
 1004. 406 U.S. 706 (1972). 
 1005. In re HTC, 889 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Brunette, 406 U.S. at 714). 
 1006. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United 
States may be sued in any judicial district, and the joinder of such a defendant shall be 
disregarded in determining where the action may be brought with respect to other 
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 1007. HTC, 889 F.3d at 1356. 
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having permanent resident status.1008  The Federal Circuit rejected 
HTC Corp.’s argument that Brunette creates a “loophole” for a plaintiff 
to forum shop, noting that HTC Corporation’s interpretation creates 
“a far more unsatisfactory loophole—a complete inability for a patent 
owner to bring its infringement claims against alien defendants that 
fall outside the non-residence-based clause of § 1400(b).”1009 
The Federal Circuit clarified the issue of where a domestic 
corporation “resides” under § 1400 when its state of incorporation has 
more than one judicial district in In re BigCommerce, Inc.1010  Plaintiffs, 
Diem and Express Mobile, each filed patent infringement suits against 
BigCommerce in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.1011  
BigCommerce is incorporated in the state of Texas and is registered 
and headquartered in Austin, Texas, which is in the Western District 
of Texas.1012  It was undisputed that BigCommerce had no place of 
business in the Eastern District of Texas.1013  BigCommerce moved to 
dismiss the Diem case and transfer the Express Mobile case, arguing that 
under the Supreme Court’s decisions in TC Heartland1014 and Stonite 
Products,1015 it resides only in the Western District of Texas.1016  In both 
cases, the district court held that “a domestic corporation resides in 
the state of its incorporation and if that state contains more than one 
judicial district, the corporate defendant resides in each such judicial 
district for venue purposes.”1017  BigCommerce petitioned for a writ of 
mandamus in both cases.1018 
The Federal Circuit found that mandamus was warranted because 
different district courts have come to different conclusions about 
whether a corporation “resides” under § 1400(b)1019 in every judicial 
                                               
 1008. Id. at 1359. 
 1009. Id. at 1360–61. 
 1010. 890 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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district within its state of incorporation when the state has more than 
one judicial district.1020  After considering the plain meaning and 
legislative history of § 1400(b), the Federal Circuit held that 
for purposes of determining venue under § 1400(b) in a state having 
multiple judicial districts, a corporate defendant shall be considered 
to ‘reside’ only in the single judicial district within that state where 
it maintains a principal place of business, or, failing that, the judicial 
district in which its registered office is located.1021 
The Federal Circuit determined that in this case venue is proper under 
the resides prong of § 1400(b) only in the Western District of Texas.1022 
In In re ZTE (USA) Inc.,1023 the Federal Circuit granted ZTE’s petition 
for a writ of mandamus, vacated the order denying ZTE’s motion to 
dismiss, and remanded for reconsideration.1024  The Federal Circuit 
found that the case presented two basic and undecided issues relating 
to proper judicial administration:  whether Federal Circuit or regional 
circuit law governs the burden of proof for determining the propriety 
of venue under § 1400(b), and on which party the burden rests.1025  On 
the first issue, the Federal Circuit held that Federal Circuit law governs 
the placement of the burden of persuasion on the propriety of venue 
under § 1400(b).1026  On the second issue, the Federal Circuit held as 
a matter of Federal Circuit law that, upon motion by the defendant 
challenging venue in a patent case, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing proper venue.1027  Because the district court incorrectly 
assigned the burden of proof on venue to ZTE and failed to fully 
consider all relevant factors, the court vacated the order denying the 
motion and remanded for reconsideration.1028 
M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltda.1029 addressed personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign entity.1030  Patent owner sued defendant in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging 
infringement of five patents.1031  Dynamic Air Ltda. (DAL) is a foreign 
                                               
 1020. BigCommerce, 890 F.3d at 981. 
 1021. Id. at 986. 
 1022. Id. 
 1023. 890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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entity organized under the laws of Brazil with a principal place of 
business in Brazil.1032  DAL is a subsidiary of Dynamic Air Inc. which is 
a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in 
Minnesota.1033  Between October 2011 and January 2012, the Brazilian 
state-owned oil company Petroleo Brasilerio S.A. (Petrobas) requested 
bids for installation of systems on ships, and DAL subsequently won the 
bid.1034  DAL installed the allegedly infringing system on PTAB two U.S. 
flagged ships.1035  The district court dismissed the case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), finding that although the 
alleged infringing activities took place on U.S.-flagged ships that are 
themselves U.S. territory, the contract between Petrobras and DAL did 
not identify the ships on which DAL would be required to make 
installations.1036  Therefore, DAL did not purposefully avail itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the United States because its 
contacts were exclusively due to the unilateral activity of Petrobras.1037 
Reviewing the issue de novo1038 under Federal Circuit precedent, the 
Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and 
remanded for further proceedings.1039  The sole issue on appeal was 
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over DAL comports with 
due process.1040  After finding that DAL’s activities were purposefully 
directed at the United States and the claim of patent infringement 
arose out of those contacts, the burden shifted to DAL to present a 
compelling case that the presence of some other consideration would 
render jurisdiction unreasonable.1041  In assessing whether exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant would be reasonable and fair, 
the Federal Circuit considers five due process factors:  (1) the burden 
                                               
 1032. Id. 
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 1034. Id. 
 1035. Id. at 998–99. 
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 1038. Personal jurisdictional issues in patent infringement cases are reviewed de 
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on the defendant; (2) the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; 
(3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; 
(4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the 
states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.1042  
Because the exclusive licensee of the asserted patents, and therefore 
one of the allegedly injured parties is a U.S. domiciliary, the Federal 
Circuit determined that it has a paramount interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief in a U.S. court.1043  Because the 
exclusive licensee is a U.S. plaintiff trying to enforce its U.S. patents for 
alleged infringing activity in a U.S. territory, the court found that the 
first three factors strongly favor exercising specific personal jurisdiction 
over DAL.1044  Regarding the final two factors, concerned “with the 
potential clash of substantive social policies between competing fora and 
the efficiency of a resolution to the controversy,” the forum here is the 
entire United States so no competing forum is available and the court 
had “no reason to believe that the [f]ederal [g]overnment’s interest in 
its foreign relations policies with Brazil will be hindered by allowing the 
district court to exercise personal jurisdiction” over DAL.1045  Judge 
Reyna wrote in concurrence providing additional reasoning why the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction here does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.1046 
F.   Standing 
Advanced Video Technologies LLC v. HTC Corp.1047 affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s infringement complaints for lack of 
standing because plaintiff did not have full ownership of the asserted 
patent.1048  The sole issue in the appeal was whether a co-inventor of 
the patent transferred her ownership interests in the patent under the 
terms of an employment agreement.1049  The Federal Circuit analyzed 
whether any of three provisions of the employment agreement 
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effected a transfer of ownership rights from the co-inventor:  a “will 
assign” provision, a trust provision, and a quitclaim provision.1050 
The “will assign” provision provided that the co-inventor “will assign 
to the Company” all her right, title, and interest in any inventions.1051  
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the “will assign” 
language “invoked a promise to do something in the future and did 
not effect a present assignment” and did not create an immediate 
assignment of the co-inventor’s rights.1052  The trust provision provided 
that the co-inventor “will hold in trust for the sole right and benefit of 
the Company.”1053  The Federal Circuit found that even if the co-
inventor’s interests in the invention were immediately placed in trust, 
“it does not follow that those interests were automatically, or ever, 
actually transferred out of trust in favor of [the company].”1054  Because 
under California trust law, a trust beneficiary “generally is not the real 
party in interest,” “may not sue in the name of the trust,” and “has no 
legal title or ownership interest in the trust assets,”1055 the plaintiff 
cannot maintain a patent infringement suit where the co-inventor is 
not a party nor can she be involuntarily joined as a plaintiff in the 
pending suit.1056  Finally, the “quitclaim assignment” providing that the 
co-inventor “waive and quitclaim to the Company any and all claims” 
served to waive the co-inventor’s rights to interests in any patent rights 
that she assigned under the agreement.1057  Because no patent rights were 
ever assigned, the Federal Circuit found that the quitclaim provision did 
not affect an assignment of the patent from the co-inventor.1058 
Judge O’Malley concurred because binding precedent “compels the 
result.”1059  However, Judge O’Malley wrote separately to express her 
belief that the binding precedent “that a non-consenting co-owner or 
co-inventor can never be involuntarily joined in an infringement 
action pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Circuit Rules of Civil 
Procedure is incorrect.”1060  Judge Newman dissented because the 
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employment agreement “placed ownership of the employee’s 
inventions with the employer” and therefore the co-inventor had no 
ownership interest in the asserted patent.1061 
James v. j2 Cloud Services, LLC1062 addressed standing in the 
correction-of-inventorship context.1063  Plaintiff filed a correction-of-
inventorship claim alleging that he is the sole inventor of a patent that 
lists two different individuals as inventors.1064  The patent was originally 
assigned to JFAX, the company owned by the listed inventors, and 
subsequently assigned to Advanced Messaging Technologies, Inc. 
(AMT).1065  The defendant in this case, j2, has an exclusive license to 
the patent.1066  At the time of the invention, the plaintiff worked for 
GSP Software, which entered into a contract with JFAX to develop 
software to provide fax-to-email, email-to-fax, and voicemail-to-email 
functionalities.1067  The plaintiff admitted that he assigned all 
copyrights in code and compiled software to JFAX but denied 
assigning any patent ownership or inventorship rights.1068  The district 
court dismissed the case finding that the plaintiff lacked Article III 
standing because he “fail[ed] to allege facts sufficient to show that he 
has an ownership or financial interest in the . . . patent.”1069  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed and reversed. 
The Federal Circuit concluded that if the plaintiff were to prevail on 
his allegations that he was the sole inventor and that sole inventorship 
entails sole ownership, he would have stood to gain concretely.1070  
Such gain would be directly related to the merits of the claim and would 
redress the injury of being deprived of allegedly rightful ownership 
which, absent other facts, would be sufficient to give plaintiff Article III 
standing.1071  The case therefore turned on whether the plaintiff 
assigned his patent rights to JFAX under either the software 
development agreement or by the “hired-to-invent doctrine.”1072  The 
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Federal Circuit found that the software development agreement was 
amenable to the construction that it does not assign, or promise to 
assign, patent rights that would otherwise accrue to the plaintiff as an 
inventor.1073  At the present stage of the litigation, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the agreement must be construed in plaintiff’s favor and 
therefore does not deprive plaintiff of constitutional standing.1074  The 
court also determined that the “hired-to-invent” rule, recognizing that an 
employer may “claim an employee’s inventive work where the employer 
specifically hires or directs the employee to exercise inventive faculties,” 
was inapplicable.1075  Unlike prior cases applying the rule, the agreement 
for engagement of services in this case was between two artificial legal 
entities, and the inventor was not personally a party to either.1076 
G.   Jury Instructions 
Flexuspine, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.1077 involved the impact of the 
jury’s failure to heed a “stop instruction” in the jury verdict form.1078  
In Flexuspine, the verdict form instructed the jury to address the 
questions of invalidity and damages only if they made an affirmative 
finding of infringement.1079  However, after finding no infringement, 
the jury indicated that the claims were also found invalid and wrote “0” 
for the damages amount.1080  After the district court instructed the jury 
to re-execute the verdict form consistent with the instructions therein, 
the jury found the claims not to be infringed and left the questions of 
invalidity and damages unanswered.1081  The district court dismissed 
the defendant’s Rule 59(e) motion requesting that the judgment be 
amended to include the jury’s invalidity verdict as well as the 
defendant’s invalidity counterclaims, rendering the Rule 50(b) motion 
for judgment as a matter of law on invalidity moot.1082 
The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s contention that the district 
court was not authorized to direct the jury to further consider its 
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answers and verdict because the “jury’s answers to the validity and 
damages questions ‘had to conflict’ with the jury’s answer of no 
infringement” because the verdict form predicated the answers to 
those questions on an affirmative response to the infringement 
question.1083  The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the district court’s dismissal of its invalidity 
counterclaims violated defendant’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
claim.1084  Because defendant failed to object to the verdict form, the 
issue of invalidity was submitted to the jury as an affirmative defense, 
not a counterclaim.1085  Therefore, the district court did not deprive 
defendant of its right to a jury trial outright, “it merely declined to 
submit its counterclaims to this jury.”1086  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Rule 50(b) claim, finding 
that a “district court judge faced with an invalidity counterclaim 
challenging a patent that it concludes was not infringed may either 
rehear the claim or dismiss it without prejudice.”1087 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit resolved many cases in 2018 
that significantly impacted the practice of patent law. The next year 
will bring further clarity from the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
on the issues ranging from Article III standing, IPR real party in 
interest, on-sale bar, and fair, reasonable, and on-discriminatory 
royalties for standards-essential patents. And as always, we expect the 
Federal Circuit and PTO to provide more guidance on the contours 
§ 101 in 2019. 
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